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Abstract 
 
Interpreting Friedrich Nietzsche’s unorthodox conception of friendship is the focus of the 
following dissertation.  In couching his conception of friendship within his naturalistic 
philosophy of the human person and his morality, I aim to establish the central 
importance of friendship in Nietzsche’s philosophy.  An equally important second aim is 
to demonstrate how Nietzsche’s philosophy of friendship is distinctly constructive in 
contrast to other aspects of his philosophy.  These aims are addressed in three chapters: in 
the first chapter I examine how Nietzsche discusses friendship in his works, in what tone 
he discusses friendship, and I will briefly discuss how his conception friendship might 
have been influenced by his own friendships.  In the second chapter I describe 
Nietzsche’s friendship, demonstrating how his friendship relates to other aspects of his 
philosophy, including his naturalistic world-conception and his philosophy of the human 
person.  In the final chapter I discuss how Nietzsche’s understanding of friendship is 
implicitly moral and how his positive interpretation of friendship is distinctly 
constructive in contrast to his criticisms of morality.  
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has been accepted for award of any degree or diploma in any other institution. 
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published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of 
the dissertation. 
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Among Friends 
An Epilogue 
 
1 
Fine to lie in quiet together, 
Finer still to join in laughing – 
Underneath a silken heaven 
Lying back amid the grasses 
Join with friends in cheerful laughing, 
Showing our white teeth together. 
 
Am I right? let’s lie in quiet; 
Am I wrong? let’s join in laughing 
And in being aggravating, 
Aggravating, loudly laughing, 
Till we reach the grave together. 
 
Shall we do this, friends, again? 
Amen! and auf Wiedersehn! 
 
Human, All Too Human, 1878 
 
 
*** 
 
 
The friend should be the festival of the earth to you and an anticipation of the overman… 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 1883 
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- Introduction - 
 
Perhaps more than many other philosophers, Friedrich Nietzsche wove his 
personality and feelings throughout his philosophy, reminding his readers that philosophy 
is not simply books, ideas and abstractions.  Rather philosophy should pervade the daily 
routines, the most casual interactions and all things that could be too plain for many other 
philosophers.  Nietzsche is a philosopher of life, calling his audience to revaluate values 
and to reinterpret themselves.  Where long-winded arguments on the nature of truth and 
morality are less common in Nietzsche’s works, more common are short aphorisms and 
rhymes.  (This is not to say that Nietzsche’s philosophy lacks larger arguments nor does 
he disregard topics such as truth and morality.  Rather, Nietzsche begins with the 
seemingly minuscule, and then follows his examination into larger philosophical themes.)  
In these snippets and aphorisms, he invites his audience to revaluate the elements of life 
most intimate to their being, engaging topics such as pity, art, and the topic of this paper, 
friendship.   
 As the opening quote suggests, Nietzsche holds a distinctly unorthodox view of 
friendship, in which laughing, aggravation and silence are all elements of friendship.  
Nietzsche depicts friendship as a relationship that includes a variety of interactions, some 
of which are casual and playful and other interactions that are combative and aggravating.  
By inviting silence, laughter and confrontation into friendship, Nietzsche suggests that a 
healthy friendship is not an ideal to ‘live up to’ but rather something that is complex and 
necessarily includes elements of conflict.  The second quote above demonstrates the 
importance of friendship in Nietzsche’s philosophy: he is not simply describing a type of 
relationship but instead approaches friendship with the understanding that it is an avenue 
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to the Übermensch – the person who leads the most fulfilling life in Nietzsche’s 
philosophy.  
From Arisotle, through to the philosophers Montaigne and Bacon, and to 
Nietzsche, the notion of friendship continues to invoke philosophical discussion and 
thought; the most basic formative question being, “what is friendship?”  The variety of 
answers implies that friendship is a complicated issue, even though it is one of the most 
elemental relationships a person experiences in life.  Aristotle, for example addresses 
friendship in several books of his Nichomachean Ethics, and yet, as Jacques Derrida 
notes,1 Aristotle confronts his audience with an ambiguous declaration: “My friends, 
there are no friends.”2  Centuries later, Montaigne paints friendship as almost mystical 
and beyond the limitations of expression.3  Bacon argues that friendship is purely 
instrumental.4  The interpretations of friendship are so varied that it seems friendship can 
either be the most sacred and beautiful relationship shared between two people or that 
friendship is the romanticized label that we give to two people using each other for their 
own personal gains.  Friendship might be a moral action or perhaps amoral, 
circumstantial or “beyond moral.”  Friendship can either aim for impartiality or concede 
explicit favoritism; and is both argued to be rooted in altruism or contrastingly in self-
interestedness.   
Aristotle’s treatment of friendship – both pensive and thorough – generally stands 
as a starting point for those philosophers who investigate friendship.  For this discussion 
                                                 
1
 Derrida, Jacques, Politics of Friendship, (trans. George Collins), Verso, London, 1997. 
2
 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, (trans. Terence Irwin), Hackett Publishing, New York, 1985.  
3
 Montaigne, “Of Friendship,” Other Selves (ed. Michael Pakuluk), Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 
1991, Cambridge, 185-199.  
4
 Bacon, Francis, “Of Friendship,” Other Selves (ed. Michael Pakuluk), Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 
Cambridge, 1991, 200-207. 
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on Nietzsche’s treatment of friendship, delineating the key elements of Aristotle’s 
friendship would be helpful in generally describing what I refer to as “orthodox 
friendship.”  Elements of Nietzsche’s treatment starkly contrast ideas that seem to be 
“orthodox.”  For example, “orthodox” friendship can be described as stable and 
categorically supportive.  In other aspects, however, Nietzsche and Aristotle’s friendship, 
share similarities: for example, both Nietzsche and Aristotle agree that friends improve 
one another, and more or less, in a moral sense.5  Both in Aristotle and Nietzsche, the 
process of human flourishing occurs within the context of friends and society.  For self-
discovery (and ultimately moral refinement), one must attain knowledge of oneself by 
looking towards friends, which is a conclusion similar to the spirit of Nietzsche’s 
valuation of friendship.  
 In Aristotle’s treatment, there are elements of friendship that should also be 
considered orthodox because of their prevalence within discussion of the philosophy of 
friendship, but also because they seem practical.  For example, Aristotle notes that the 
concern of one person must be reciprocated by the other if their relationship is to be 
considered a friendship.  When concern is not reciprocated, then a person is simply 
expressing goodwill.6  Aristotle also notes that in friendship, friends are concerned with 
each others’ well-being in-itself.7  Likewise, one is not truly a friend if he or she cares for 
another, hoping for some other end; or colloquially, one should not use their friends as 
means to other ends.  Aristotle further expounds that a friend is “another self”8, and, as 
                                                 
5
 Tabensky, Pedro Alexis, Happiness: Personhood, Community, Purpose, Ashgate Publishing, Burling, VT, 
2003, pp. 147-207. 
6
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book VII, chapter 3, 1155b30 (p. 210). 
7
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book VII, chapter 3, 1155b30 (p. 210). 
8
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book IX, chapter 11, 1166a-1172 (p.245). 
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Pedro Tabensky summarizes, friends help each other to “more fully realize each person’s 
own capacities as a rational agent, and so promote each person’s happiness.”9   
 That a person must not have ulterior motives for a friendship and that friends must 
be equally concerned with one another are aspects that I consider to be philosophically 
“orthodox.”  Moreover, these aspects seem practical and reasonable in reality and not just 
in theory.  In this sense, while Aristotle’s treatment is philosophically significant, I argue 
that his idea of friendship is additionally engaging and holds a certain amount of 
authority because most people have similar experiences with their own friendships.   
 If Aristotle’s friendship is “orthodox” and reasonable, then Nietzsche’s friendship 
can be described as distinctly “unorthodox”, and it is my intention to show how 
Nietzsche’s is such in this dissertation.  For example, Aristotle notes that one should 
value their friends in-themselves, conversely Nietzsche argues that a person can (and 
will) use their friends instrumentally as they strive to become Übermenchen.  (This topic 
will be discussed later in Chapter II, section D.)  Aristotle also argues that virtuous 
friendships are stable,10 whereas Nietzsche advocates that in a healthy relationship, a 
person must be willing to risk losing their friendship if it has become parasitic and limits 
their ability grow.11  
Nietzsche’s conception of friendship, containing elements of self-interestedness 
and criticism, is unlike a traditional conception of friendship which includes aspects like 
altruism, intimacy and compassion.  Compared to these traditional interpretations of 
friendship (Plato’s or Aristotle’s conception, for example) Nietzsche’s friendship is 
                                                 
9
 Irwin, T.H., “Aristotle”, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (edited by Craig, E.) Routledge, London, 
1998. Retrieved August 23, 2007, from http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/A022SECT25 
10
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book VIII, chapter 7, 1159a5-25 (p. 221). 
11
 D §563, 226. 
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seemingly violent at times, reckless and combative, and in the absence of conceptualizing 
his understanding of friendship within a broader Nietzschean philosophical context, 
Nietzsche’s friends are more similar to the relationship shared between two enemies than 
two persons concerned with each others’ well-being.  Thus, in this dissertation I will 
demonstrate how Nietzsche’s conception of friendship, without traditional elements like 
compassion and selflessness, encourages friends to revaluate aspects of their life in which 
they have become complacent.  His conception of friendship, moreover, reflects the 
fundamental idea within his philosophy that humans are not fixed but moldable and have 
the potential to develop and evolve.  Demarcated by a corrective tone, he prescribes a 
relationship that intends to bring about the greatest potential within a person through 
unconventional methods.  
At the most basic level Nietzsche evaluates friendship in terms of how well the 
relationship improves the friends; thus, he places particular emphasis on friends who are 
critical of one another.  True friends, he argues, are not unconditionally supportive but 
recognize their own selfish motives within the relationship and true friends are willing to 
sacrifice the relationship in order to better themselves.  Dissimilar to the common 
perception of friendship as encompassing compassion and encouragement, Nietzsche’s 
prescribes a friendship in which friends challenge one another with intent to cultivate 
honesty and self-mastery.  In this sense, for Nietzsche, friends are integral to the most 
fulfilling aspects of a person’s life including self-mastery and self-awareness – both 
characteristics of the Übermensch.12   Investigating with a view to understanding the 
peculiar nature of Nietzsche’s friendship is what drives this dissertation. 
                                                 
12
 For example: Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Gay Science. (trans. Kaufmann, Walter,) Vintage Books, New 
York, 1989, VI 324, 255; Z Prologue 3, 12-3; Z II “On those Who are Sublime””, 116-7. 
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 As with any aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophy, interpretation is required, and so it 
is with the following treatment of Nietzsche’s friendship.  Before investigating the 
combative and selfish friendship that Nietzsche prescribes, however, extensive 
consideration will be given to how Nietzsche deals with friendship and what Nietzsche 
means by “friendship.”  In this sense, the following paper is primarily interpretative.  
Two significant themes dictate how I interpret Nietzsche’s understanding of friendship: 
first, Nietzsche’s philosophy reflects his adherence to a natural interpretation of the world 
in which humans are animals, and moralities are a creation of humans.  I argue that, for 
Nietzsche, friendship is understood as a relationship shared between two animal-like 
beings who benefit most from the relationship when acknowledging their nature.  A 
second theme that directs this paper relates to Nietzsche’s naturalistic interpretation of 
people, friendships and the world, in that he also understands people to be both moldable 
and capable of improvement and regression.13  For Nietzsche, persons are not fixed but 
they are organic beings, a culmination of their upbringings, surroundings and 
evolutionary drives.  Thus, the following interpretation of Nietzsche also reflects the idea 
that, capable of change, humans are influenced by their relationships and particularly 
their friendships.  
________________________________ 
 
Nietzsche’s friendship, while addressed in several quintessential works on 
Nietzsche (for instance Kaufmann’s Nietzsche and Derrida’s Politics of Friendship) has 
                                                 
13
 For example, GS I 26, 100; GS IV 307, 246. 
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not received much attention from scholars working on Nietzsche. 14  One likely reason 
for this neglect might be that there are other aspects of his philosophy that are more 
appealing for scholars to research, such as Nietzsche’s theory of “truth” and his criticisms 
of morality.  Friendship as an avenue of philosophical inquiry, in Nietzsche’s philosophy 
or any other philosophy, is dwarfed to the historically popular concepts of philosophy 
like theories of truth and morality.  In this sense, as friendship is a lesser discussed aspect 
of philosophy on the whole, Nietzsche’s conception of friendship has also received less 
attention in Nietzsche scholarship.  (This argument, of course, is not particular to 
Nietzsche but applicable to most other philosophers.  Aristotle’s friendship, while the 
focus of a notable amount of scholarship, has received much less attention and is 
generally regarded as being ‘less important’ than Aristotle’s ethics, for example.)   
One other reason that Nietzsche’s friendship has received less attention is that it is 
distinctly positive in contrast to other aspects of his philosophy.  For many Nietzsche is 
regarded as a depressing philosopher with nihilistic tendencies; certain passages in the 
Geneaology, for example, explain why one might draw these conclusions.  His 
conception of friendship, however, is equally positive and hopeful as it is also bleak and 
self-interested.  The implication here is that an unbiased examination of Nietzsche’s 
friendship (in which positive conclusions are drawn) contrasts with the generally 
accepted notion of Nietzsche being a dark philosopher.  A base reading of Nietzsche – the 
reading that primarily focuses on his nihilistic statements – disregards his valuation of 
friendship; however, in rereading Nietzsche as a constructive philosopher (in regard to 
                                                 
14
 Kaufmann, Walter, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, Princeton University Press, 
Random House, New York, 1968, 363-71. 
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friends), a more interesting conclusion is that Nietzsche was not strictly a nihilist but that 
he also held a constructive conception of morality.15    
In couching his conception of friendship within his naturalistic philosophy of the 
human person and his philosophy of morality, I aim to establish the central importance of 
friendship in Nietzsche’s philosophy.  An equally important second aim is to demonstrate 
how Nietzsche’s philosophy of friendship is distinctly constructive in contrast to other 
aspects of his philosophy.  These aims are addressed in three chapters: in the first chapter 
I examine how Nietzsche discusses friendship in his works, in what tone he discusses 
friendship, and I briefly discuss how his conception friendship might have been 
influenced by his own friendships.  In the second chapter I describe Nietzsche’s 
friendship, demonstrating how his friendship relates to other aspects of his philosophy, 
including his naturalistic world-conception and his philosophy of the human person.  In 
the final chapter I discuss how Nietzsche’s understanding of friendship is implicitly 
moral and how his positive interpretation of friendship is distinctly constructive in 
contrast to his criticisms of morality.  
Herein is the value of asking “what is Nietzsche’s understanding of friendship?”  
The question not only provides insight into an under-examined aspect of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy but the answer introduces a more positive interpretation of his philosophy.  If 
moralities rest on untenable and self-alienating principles as Nietzsche suggests, then it is 
worthwhile to further investigate how he treats friendship – a relationship in which there 
                                                 
15
 For more on Nietzsche’s criticisms of morality, see primary sources: Nietzsche, Friedrich, 1989, The 
Twilight of the Idols (TI). (trans. Kaufmann, Walter.) Penguin Books, New York, VII 1; Nietzsche, 
Friedrich, On the Genealogy of Morals (GM), (trans. Kaufmann, Walter,) Vintage Books, New York, 1967, 
Preface 6. 
Also, see secondary sources, sources Foot, Philippa, “Nietzsche’s Immoralism,” Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
Morality (ed. Richard Schacht),  University of California Press, Berkeley, 1994, p. 5; Clark, Maudemarie, 
“Nietzsche’s Immoralism and the Concept of Morality,” Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality (ed. Richard 
Schacht),  University of California Press, Berkeley, 1994, 15-7. 
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is no intrinsic good in caring for the other person.  The following examination aims to 
make clear what Nietzsche meant by friendship in respect to his treatment of morality and 
his commitment to a naturalistic perception of the world.  
Significant evidence supports the notion that Nietzsche attributed particular 
importance to the idea of friendship, and in the first section of the paper I will give 
textual and biographical evidence in support of this claim. 
- 14-  
- Chapter One -  
 Nietzsche and Friendship   
 
In this first chapter of this paper I will show how Nietzsche’s philosophy, 
published works and his personal life demonstrate the importance of friendship in his 
philosophy.  I will also introduce three important reasons why Nietzsche’s conception of 
friendship justifies examination.  For instance, there are a number of passages in 
Nietzsche’s work in which he explicitly discusses friendship.  I will demonstrate how 
these discussions are indicative of the importance that Nietzsche placed on friendship in 
his moral schema.  The manner in which Nietzsche addresses his readers – particularly 
when he addresses them as “[his] friends” or “[his] brothers” – also suggests that 
Nietzsche relates to his audience as he might relate to his friends.  Finally, Nietzsche’s 
life is highlighted by several significant relationships, (eg. Richard Wagner); I will 
consider and evaluate these relationships in terms of how they influenced the 
development of his philosophy.  It is in the first chapter that I establish the relevance of a 
discussion on Nietzsche’s friendship, beginning with how and where Nietzsche discusses 
friendship in his philosophy.   
- 15-  
A.  Passages on Friendship 
Nietzsche explicitly deals with friendship in approximately thirty passages in his 
major works; however, his interest in friendship is not contained only within these 
passages but additionally in many other passages and chapters in which he implicitly 
deals with the nature of relationships.  Nietzsche implicitly addresses friendship when he 
discusses pity, solitude, and virtue.  The degree to which Nietzsche implicitly deals with 
friendship, however, is difficult to define as he pays significant consideration to the 
human psyche and moral sensations.  Nonetheless, there are certain aspects of 
Nietzsche’s thinking that affect and characterize his conception of friendship.  The 
implicit references to friendship, while numerous and telling, are also ambiguous in the 
absence of further examination into how the passages fit into the context of his wider 
discussions.  The implicit references to friendship also need to be read in comparison 
with other passages that explicitly and implicitly deal with friendship.   
In addition to the implicit references, Nietzsche also explicitly analyzes friendship 
in many passages and aphorisms throughout his work.16  It can be inferred from the 
                                                 
16
 Specifically, according to this research, Nietzsche evaluates friendship in approximately 25 or more 
instances throughout his philosophical development.   
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 1996, Human, All too Human, A Book for Free Spirits (HAH), (trans. R.J. 
Holingdale,) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, “Man in Society” §305, 137.  
HAH VI §354, 143.  
HAH VI §368, 145.  
HAH VI §376, 148-9. 
HAH VII §378, 150.  
HAH VII §390;, 151.  
HAH IX §491, 179.  
HAH IX §499, 180.  
HAH IX §559, 186.  
HAH X “Among Friends, an Epilogue”, 205.  
Nietzsche, Friedrich, Daybreak (D), (translated by Hollingdale, R.J., edited by Leiter, 
Brian and Clark, Maudemarie), Cambridge University Press, New York, 1997, 
IV §225, 137.  
D IV §226, 138.  
D IV §287, 152. 
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consistent number of explicit references to friendship, that Nietzsche understood this 
topic as possessing similar philosophical importance as other, more discussed concepts, 
such as pity, punishment and revenge.  I will now outline the development of Nietzsche’s 
conception of friendship in his works.  
 Human, All too Human is the first work in which Nietzsche demonstrates that 
friendship is a topic worth discussing.  Here his aphorisms and evaluations address how 
one maintains a balanced friendship, how the ancient Greeks related the term “friend” to 
“relative,” and why a person desires friends.17   Nietzsche also concludes the first volume 
of Human, All Too Human (published in 1878) with the epilogue “Among Friends.”18  
The ideas introduced in Human, All Too Human reflect the aim to evaluate a person’s 
experience in the world, including an investigation of religion and religious experiences, 
art, moral sensations and friends.  Beginning with a critical analysis of what it means to 
be “human, all too human,” Nietzsche concludes by acclaiming the life of the “free 
spirit.”19  The crude assessment of the human experience and his benediction to embrace 
freedom are driving themes common in Human, All Too Human, Daybreak, and The Gay 
                                                                                                                                                 
D IV §313, 157.  
D V §484, 199.  
D V §489, 200.  
D V §503, 204.  
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 1989, The Gay Science (GS). (trans. Kaufmann, Walter,) Vintage Books, New York, 
“Joke, Cunning…”  §14,  47.  
GS “Joke, Cunning…”, §41, 57. 
GS I §14, 88.  
GS I §32, 103.  
GS IV §279, 225.  
Nietzsche, Friedrich, Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Z), (trans. Kaufmann, Walter,) Viking Press, New York, 
1966, “On the Friend”, 55-7.  
Z I “On Love of the Neighbor”, 60-62.  
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 1967, Beyond Good and Evil, (trans. Kaufmann, Walter,) Vintage Books, New York, 
“From High Mountains”, 240. 
17
 HAH VI §305, 137; HAH VI §354, 143; HAH IX §559, 186.  
18
 HAH X “Among Friends, An Epilogue,” 205. 
19
 Nietzsche uses the term “free spirits” to classify with people who have potential to grow, creativity and 
other qualities that become associated with the Übermensch.   See BGE, 26; HAH VI “Man in Society” 
§324, 139; Z prologue §3, 12-3. 
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Science.  In Nietzsche’s own words these works are demarcated by “the common goal 
[to] erect a new image and ideal of the free spirit.”20 
 Throughout the so-called ‘middle’ works Nietzsche returns to evaluate friendship, 
demonstrating the unique role of friendship in his “free spirit philosophy.”  While 
friendship became a point of analysis in Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche continues his 
evaluation in Daybreak and even more so in The Gay Science.  Nietzsche’s treatment of 
friendship in Daybreak is different from other treatments in that he also includes a 
warning of unhealthy friendship.21  For instance, in passage 225 in Daybreak Nietzsche 
describes how a person who speaks “his” mind often becomes a “burdening 
acquaintance.”22  In passage 287 he describes the problem of friends honestly 
understanding each other, and in passage 484, he describes how friends have the potential 
to constrict one’s thinking.23  Nietzsche’s assessment of unhealthy friendship in 
Daybreak tempers the celebration of friendship in Human, All Too Human.  While a 
friendship should have the Socratic characteristic of inspiring the ideals of the free spirit, 
Daybreak warns his audience of unhealthy friends – others who hinder growth.  I will 
later show how his treatment of unhealthy friendship helps to distinguish healthy 
friendship. 
                                                 
20
 GS, back cover.  Quoted in Richard Schacht’s introduction to Human, All too Human (1996), p. xxi.  
21
 Nietzsche does not use the term “unhealthy” or “bad friendship” specifically in any of his works but 
rather describes his friends as “undesirable disciples” (GS I §32, 103) and “obtrusive [dogs]” (GS IV §312, 
249), for example.  I have decided to use the word unhealthy to describe Nietzsche’s negative friendships 
because it captures the idea that he understood friends as either being conducive or detrimental to 
cultivating the Übermensch.  
22
 Aiming to remain consistent with the tone of Nietzsche’s original text, I will not change the gender-
specific pronouns in the following paper.  The issue of how Nietzsche treats gender, particularly in terms of 
friendship, is another avenue worthy of research; however, this issue is beyond the scope of this paper.  
Particularly relevant to this discussion is Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, “On the friend,” (Kaufmann 
trans., p. 53).  
23
 D IV §225, 137; D IV §287, 152; D V §484, 199.  Passage D I §226, 138, also refers to the harmful 
effects of befriending a celebrity – an allusion to Richard Wagner.  
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 Nietzsche’s The Gay Science also contains a variety of passages that demonstrate 
the importance of “friendship” in his “free spirit” philosophy and contains passages 
similar to the passages contained in Human, All Too Human and Daybreak.24  These 
sections include, for instance, passage 14 in The Gay Science where Nietzsche discusses 
the nature of love, (which contains an interesting comparison to other allusions to Greek 
friendship.25)  In regard to “friendship,” the tone of The Gay Science is slightly different 
to the prior “free spirit works,” demarcated by emphasis on overcoming, sublimation and 
cultivation – themes characteristic of his later works.  If “friendship” in Human, All Too 
Human and Daybreak could be described as a return to the thinking of platonic love and a 
warning of unhealthy friendship, then the “friendship” of The Gay Science differs from 
the previous works in that he relates friendship with ideas of disagreement, “feuding” and 
conflict.  It is in this work that Nietzsche delineates the value of hardship and 
disagreement in the self-cultivation process.  
Reflecting another transition in his philosophical journey, Nietzsche refers to 
friendship much less frequently in his later works.  Friendship is not completely 
abandoned, however, and he explicitly addresses the subject in several passages of the 
later works.  For example, two of his most concise treatments of “friendship” are 
contained in his self-proclaimed magnum opus, Thus Spoke Zarathustra.  “On the Friend” 
and “On Love of the Neighbor” in the first book of Zarathustra assuredly stand as the 
paramount point of reference for his conception of friendship.  It is in these two passages 
that Nietzsche distinguishes the friend as a valuable instrument for the cultivation of the 
                                                 
24
 One unique passage is “Star friendship” GS §279, 225-6.  Here Nietzsche gives a poetic exposition on 
friendship.  Kaufmann relates it to a letter from Nietzsche to Franz Overbeck in November of 1881, see the 
Kaufmann nt. §8, p. 225 in his translation of The Gay Science. 
25
 D §503, 204; HAH §354, 143; Z “On a Thousand and One Goals” I, 58; GS II §61, 124. 
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Übermensch, when he says, “I teach you not the neighbor, but the friend.  The friend 
should be the festival of the earth to you and an anticipation of the Übermensch.”26  Here 
Nietzsche indicates that the importance of “friendship,” as developed in the agenda of his 
“free spirit” works, remains a valuable aspect of his philosophy in his later works. 
Finally, in his later works, Nietzsche returns to “friendship” in his poem “Aus 
hohen Bergen” at the conclusion of Beyond Good and Evil, in which he waits for and 
invites “new friends” to join him.  Later in On the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche only 
briefly refers to “friendship.”  Rather, the Genealogy contains implicit references to 
“friendship” by evaluating the reality of moral sensations, such as guilt, obligation, 
punishment and pity.27  He also discusses the ethic of self-cultivation in the Genealogy, 
which I will later argue to be an important element of his conception of friendship.28 
The development of Nietzsche’s conception of friendship reflects his 
philosophical interests as they changed throughout his works.  Most noticeable is his 
attention to friendship in his middle, “free spirit” works, suggesting that he associated his 
conception of friendship with his philosophy of life.  His later consideration of friendship 
in Beyond Good and Evil and the Genealogy demonstrates it was worthwhile to return to 
and further explore the value of friendship in relationship to his new philosophical 
interests.  
                                                 
26
 Z I “On Love of the Neighbor”, 60-2.  
27
 eg. GM II §8, 70-1; GM II§ 9, 71-2. 
28
 eg. GM II §24, 95-6. “Self-overcoming” and “sublimation” is also largely discussed in BGE §9, §212, 
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B. Friends as his Intended Audience  
In addition to the implicit and explicit passages on friendship, I argue that 
Nietzsche’s affinity to his audience reflects his interest in friendship.  In the following 
section I will analyze how Nietzsche addresses his audience and the ways in which this 
illustrates the importance of friendship in his philosophy.   Moreover, Nietzsche’s 
relationship with his audience demonstrates his philosophical method and epistemology, 
rooted in experimentation and perspective.  Addressing his audience as “his friends,”29 
Nietzsche employs a different method of philosophizing: rather than systematic 
arguments with formal language, Nietzsche writes in a personal tone appealing to the 
sensations of his audience. 
At the fore, is the view that Nietzsche uses a tone that is dissimilar to other 
philosophers who employ more formal language.  Nietzsche’s tone, in contrast, reflects a 
concern for his audience by using more colloquial language and making imperative 
statements that demand action from his audience.  The tone of Nietzsche’s writing style 
and his relationship to his audience is relevant to a discussion of his friendship for two 
reasons; first, Nietzsche often uses a personal tone, in which he philosophizes and 
prescribes action to both himself and his audience.  Second, identifiable in several 
passages, and especially in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the audience is explicitly addressed 
as “my friends,” suggesting that his audience is not an anonymous third-party but a select 
group of people.30  A brief discussion of Nietzsche’s audience frames his philosophy – 
particularly his conception of friendship – as a type of thinking intended for certain 
persons for whom he expresses concern for their well-being. 
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Nietzsche often uses a personal tone when addressing the audience of his work.  
For instance, in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche writes in the first person, and instead 
of conveying his criticisms to the anonymous third-person, Nietzsche philosophizes and 
prescribes a way of life for the collective audience of both himself and other “free 
spirits.”31  Consider the language of the following passage: “Honesty, supposing that this 
is our virtue from which we cannot get away, we free sprits – well, let us work on it…”32  
“Our,” “we,” “us:” Nietzsche’s language demonstrates that he too is included in his 
criticisms, and that he seeks to improve other “free spirits” as he would improve 
himself.33  The language of Beyond Good and Evil is particularly conducive to this 
interpretation.  Other works, such as the Genealogy, while still using inclusive language, 
are less prescriptive and lack the collective responsibility found in Beyond Good and 
Evil.  The Gay Science contains inclusive language34, but it also contains aphorisms 
addressed to an unknown party, (which do not include himself nor the free spirits he 
previously addressed.35  The two audiences can be separated by distinguishing between 
the ideas he directs toward the “free spirits” and his descriptions of all others.  (The 
“herd” is the language used in Thus Spoke Zarathustra.) When Nietzsche addresses the 
free spirits, he often uses language that includes himself, like “we” and “us.”  When 
excluding himself – referring to the audience as “they” or “one” – Nietzsche refers to a 
group of people with whom he feels less affinity.  These people might be described as 
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belonging to “the herd,” or they are the “camels” or “lions” of Zarathustra.36  In 
Nietzsche’s writing there is a clear distinction between the “free spirit” audience, whom 
he identifies with and prescribes his philosophy for, and all other persons.  Human, All-
too-Human, for example, is almost exclusively written to the impersonal, third person 
audience.  Yet it is clear from the subtitle that his audience is the “free spirits,” (in which 
he includes himself.37)  His audience is varied and unique to each book; and 
considerations as to why Nietzsche chose certain language is noteworthy but beyond the 
scope of this paper.  In regard to the task at hand, it suffices to reach the preliminary 
conclusion that Nietzsche used inclusive language throughout his works.  This language 
suggests that Nietzsche embraced a certain affinity and concern for his audience.38  (In 
contrast, His use of “the herd,” for example, demonstrates a clear distance with other 
people.  Nietzsche anticipated that these people would not understand his work in they 
way he intended it to be understood.)  
 In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Zarathustra often addresses his audience as either his 
“brothers,” “disciples,” or “friends.”  Zarathustra abandons the comfort of his mountain 
solitude and “goes under” to the people of the village, as he “overflows” with insight and 
wants to “become empty again.”39  The story that follows tells of Zarathustra’s attempts 
to convey an understanding of the Übermensch and the eternal recurrence, and in the 
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process, he befriends and makes disciples out of those who listen.40  The important 
implication for this paper is to make the point that Zarathustra’s relationship to his 
disciples is similar to Nietzsche’s relationship to his audience.   
It is also worth noting that Nietzsche’s books were often not well received and 
they were likely read by people who personally knew Nietzsche or knew of him prior to 
the publication.  Beginning with the poor reception of The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche 
quickly isolated himself from the philological community which in turn tarnished his 
reputation as a scholar.  As a consequence, subsequent publications received less 
scholarly attention, and towards the end of his career he paid for his own publications, 
aware of his limited audience.41  The limitations of his possible audience may also have 
been a reason Nietzsche wrote in a personal tone to a selected group of people – for not 
many people would likely read his book.  His limited audience, however, did not keep 
Nietzsche from sharing a friendship with them – those who shared in his intellectual 
freedom and insight were exactly his friends, as he understood friendship.42 
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C. Nietzsche’s Friends 
A discussion of Nietzsche’s treatment of friendship is also worthwhile in the 
context of his relationship with his peers.  Nietzsche records their influence throughout 
his philosophical works in spite of anecdotes about his extreme solitude, evidence of 
forged letters, and the blatant rumors haunting Nietzsche’s biography.  As a result, the 
infamy of his relationships threatens to become an overly dominating point in this 
discussion; yet, it is undeniably a necessary element.43  Those who study Nietzsche must 
avoid the temptation of granting the biography of his relationships too much influence on 
how a work should be interpreted.  For example, Nietzsche’s relationship with Lou 
Salomé – with whom he shared a seemingly romantic relationship – would be of interest 
for interpreters trying to understand how Nietzsche treats “love” in his works.  
Nietzsche’s relationship with Richard Wagner also invites examination from 
interpreters.44  Heeding temperance in how much focus should be placed on Nietzsche’s 
relationships is key for interpreters; it is also the case, however, that Nietzsche’s 
philosophy of the free spirit and the method in which he philosophizes invites interpreters 
to pay attention to his biography.   
As indicated in the introduction, Nietzsche philosophizes on the most basic 
elements of daily life and demands that philosophy be efficacious.  The spirit of how 
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Nietzsche philosophized is succinctly encapsulated in The Gay Science: “I favor any 
skepsis to which I may reply: ‘Let us try it!’ But I no longer wish to hear anything of all 
those things and questions that do not permit any experiment…”45  In The Gay Science, 
Nietzsche advocates a unique method of philosophizing.  Experimentalism, he argues, is 
the method for the new philosopher (or the “Versucher.”46)  According to Nietzsche’s 
understanding of experimentalism, a person hypothesizes a world-view and then tests the 
validity by examining the coherence and consistency of his explanation in light of his 
other experiences and perceptions of the world.  Coinciding with the experimentalist 
methodology of the Versucher is Nietzsche’s epistemology: perspectivism.  Briefly, as an 
epistemological perspectivist, Nietzsche understood “truth” as the intersubjective 
agreement of many personal views.  “There is only a perspective seeing, only a 
perspective ‘knowing’; and the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more 
eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our 
‘concept’ of this thing, our ‘objectivity,’ be.”47  For Nietzsche, experimentalism and 
perspectivism reorient philosophy in relation to the individual, and an individual’s 
experience in the world.  Thus, in relying on experience and perspective for knowledge, 
Nietzsche invites the notion that philosophical perspectives are never divorced from 
personal experience.   
Centrally efficacious to a person’s perspective are his friends, and so aiming to 
better ascertain his understanding of friendship, I will consider which of Nietzsche’s 
friends were most influential within his development as a philosopher and I will also 
consider how these friendships might have changed his perspective.  Before considering 
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Nietzsche’s best known friend, Richard Wagner, it is worthwhile to note that Nietzsche 
never married nor did he maintain any obviously intimate relationships.  This fact may 
aid in explaining the unorthodox conception of friendship that he developed and also why 
Nietzsche predominantly focuses on friendship rather than love.  It may also demonstrate 
his conclusion that he did not need marriage or an intimate relationship in his life, and 
that he maintained a certain emotional distance in his friendships in order for them to 
remain fruitful.  Regardless of whether the lack of intimate relationships in Nietzsche’s 
life was either a cause in his philosophical development or symptomatic of his 
conclusions, it is equally critical to identify which relationships affected Nietzsche the 
most, as it is to note  the lack of intimate relationships in his life. 
More than any other, Nietzsche’s relationship with Richard Wagner is particularly 
well-known because of Nietzsche’s early admiration and praise of the composer, and then 
explicit frustration at the end of his career.  Prior to his initial public acclamation of 
Wagner in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche shared a history with Wagner that was 
facilitated by proximity and instigated by  a common interest in Schopenhauer.  
Nietzsche sought out Wagner in 1868 when moving to Basel, as Wagner lived not far 
away in Tribschen.48  As Nietzsche’s visits to the Wagner residence became more and 
more consistent, he developed his appreciation for the cultural greatness he found in 
Wagner and his music.  In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche concludes that Wagner’s 
Tristan marks the “rebirth of Greek tragedy” and the “salvation of modern culture.”49 
 While Wagner represented the potential greatness for the spirit of a person in the 
The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche slanders him with his most insulting criticism in his last 
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writings: Wagner had become decadent.  Beginning with Human, All-too-Human, 
continuing in The Gay Science, and then culminating in The Case of Wagner and Contra 
Wagner, Nietzsche grew to detest what Wagner represented: intellectual arrogance and an 
unquestioned commitment to one’s nation.   In Nietzsche’s understanding, Wagner’s 
nationalism and Christian convictions cost him the creative spirit that made him great.  
Before lapsing into insanity, Nietzsche made it clear that his disappointment with Wagner 
was not reactionary nor the result of an unsettled disagreement. Rather his disdain for 
Wagner was an opinion that developed over many years.50 
 One further reason for considering Nietzsche’s relationship with Wagner is to 
understand a transition in Nietzsche’s thinking.  As Kaufmann portrays their early 
relationship51 (his years at Basel and through the publication of The Birth of Tragedy), 
Nietzsche celebrated the potential for cultural greatness, the psyche of the artist and the 
aesthetic theories in Wagner.  Parallel in his philosophy was the sense of a different 
agenda that lacked the polemical tone that demarcated his later thinking.  For instance his 
refutation of morality and religious faith are dominant themes in his later works, 
occurring at a time after he had ended his friendship with Wagner.  Nietzsche also 
explicates this parallel in the development of his later thinking in the “Preface” to The 
Case of Wagner: “My greatest experience was a recovery.  Wagner is merely one of my 
sicknesses.  Not that I wish to be ungrateful to this sickness.  When in this essay I assert 
the proposition that Wagner is harmful, I wish no less to assert for whom he is 
nevertheless indispensable…”52  In his own words, Nietzsche interprets his relationship 
                                                 
50
 Kaufmann, The Case of Wagner, “Introduction,” 155.  
51
 Kaufmann, Nietzsche, 30-41. 
52
 Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Case of Wagner (CW), (trans. Walter Kaufmann.) Random House, New York, 
1967, 155.   
- 28-  
with Wagner as being representative of his earlier, less-matured philosophy.  Eventually, 
after finding fault in his friendships and philosophy, he changes his attention to the 
philosophical interest that defined his life’s work (like his polemics against morality and 
Christianity.)  “Perhaps nobody was more dangerously attached to – grown together with 
– Wagnerizing; nobody tried harder to resist it; nobody was happier to be rid of it.  A 
long story!  - You want a word for it? – If I were a moralist, who knows what I might call 
it?  Perhaps self-overcoming.”53  Here Nietzsche acknowledges Wagner’s crucial role in 
his own “self-overcoming,” which later becomes a central theme in his philosophy. 
 While his relationship with Wagner had public and symbolic value, Nietzsche 
shared other formative friendships.54  Lou Salomé, Paul Reé and Elizabeth Förester-
Nietzsche are generally the most discussed figures in his life and are worth discussion; 
however, for the sake of brevity, only a limited mention will be made here.  Moreover, 
while Salomé, Reé and Förester-Nietzsche are the most discussed relationships, 
Nietzsche also corresponded and spent considerable time with a handful of other 
academics, graduate students and casual friends.  Perhaps the best way to cover the 
multitude of relations is to recognize certain relationships that were particularly 
philosophically formative in contrast to the variety of other relationships he shared.  For 
instance, from Nietzsche’s letters it is evident that he found Lou Salomé to be someone 
whom he not only enjoyed as company but also as a colleague and as a free spirit with 
whom he could discuss his philosophy.55   
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 Of those relationships which had a formative effect – in that Nietzsche found their 
influence to be personally cultivating – Paul Reé, Jacob Burckhardt and Lou Salomé are 
the most notable.  Burckhardt, a scholar of ancient Greek history at Basel, befriended 
Nietzsche over a common appreciation of ancient Greece and Renaissance Italy.56  
Nietzsche demonstrated a standing affinity for Burckhardt throughout his entire life, and 
his last sane letter was sent to Burckhardt.57  In Burckhardt Nietzsche saw the potential in 
people to overcome social influences, noticing Burkhardt’s discipline.58   
 Nietzsche, Salomé and Reé shared an intellectually fruitful but complicated 
relationship.  Reé and Nietzsche met while studying at Basel, where Reé was finishing 
his masters thesis on Aristotelian Ethics.  From then on, Nietzsche maintained a 
consistent relationship with Reé that Kaufmann describes as a relationship where both 
often consulted each other on various works and that “[the relationship] was one of the 
best things that happened to Nietzsche.”59  Reé was also the person who introduced him 
to Lou Salomé in 1882.  Upon their acquaintance, Nietzsche was quickly impressed by 
Salomé’s intelligence and passion, and invited her to spend a summer in Tautenberg.  He 
explained that he longed to “teach her” and “confide in” her.60  The complexity of 
Nietzsche’s relationship with Salomé and Reé, however, then becomes arduous to 
uncertain (and beyond the scope of this discussion), marked by rumors of marriage 
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proposals (from both Nietzsche and Reé) and a certain falling out at the end of 1882.61  
However, it is worth noting that a defining characteristic of their relationship was the 
practice of encouraging and challenging – a characteristic that I will show to be central to 
his conception of friendship.   
This characteristic is particularly evident in the letters Nietzsche sent to Reé, 
Burckhardt and “dear Lou.”  For instance, Nietzsche asks Burckhardt to read The Gay 
Science, valuing his opinion as the verdict for approval.62  When it was no longer 
possible to challenge and encourage one another – when the relationship became parasitic 
– Nietzsche conceded the relationship to solitude and acknowledged the need to part 
ways.  For instance, in a letter to Salomé, he writes “Adieu, my dear Lou.  I shall not see 
you again.  Preserve your soul from similar actions and make good to others and 
especially to my friend Reé what you cannot make good to me any more.”63  From 
Nietzsche’s letters, it is possible to notice the consistency between how he treated his 
actual friends and his philosophy of friendship.  Demonstrating the connection between 
his actual friends and his philosophical writings, his letters demonstrate his aim to 
challenge and cultivate his friends.  
 Franz Overbeck, Peter Gast and others also shared friendships with Nietzsche, in 
varying importance and because of various interests.  For Nietzsche, though, these 
relationships lacked the certain characteristic that distinguished Reé, Salomé and 
Burckhardt as good friends.  Overbeck and Gast (and Elizabeth Förester-Nietzsche) made 
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for enjoyable company at times, but did not necessarily challenge Nietzsche in a way that 
he desired from his dearest friends.  As Kaufmann describes Gast and Förester-Nietzsche, 
they were “undesirable disciples” because they were too agreeable and distracted by the 
proximity of the friendship.64  Nietzsche reveals his opinion of Gast and Förester-
Nietzsche in The Gay Science: “This one cannot say No, and that one says to everything: 
‘Half and Half.’”65  For Nietzsche, friends must be willing to be combative for the sake of 
improving themselves and each other.  Nietzsche uses his relationship with Gast and 
Förester-Nietzsche as an example of the poorest type of friends, as exemplars of friends 
who avoided all disagreement and in doing so, they also avoided any opportunity to 
better themselves and Nietzsche.  He reiterates his disdain for this unhealthy type of 
friendship in Ecce Homo: “One repays a teacher badly if one always remains a pupil 
only.”66  Gast and Förester-Nietzsche remained, for Nietzsche, pupils, and thus never 
became the type of friends he sought in Reé and Salomé.67  Nietzsche’s relationship with 
Gast and Förester-Nietzsche are fitting contrasts to Reé and Salomé; a more thorough 
examination of these relationships and his many others demand a longer treatment in a 
more appropriate discussion.  By introducing Nietzsche’s attitude towards the 
friendships, I aim to demonstrate the similarities between how Nietzsche treated his 
friends and how he discusses friendship in his philosophy.  
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______________________ 
 
In this chapter I have pointed to evidence that suggests the importance of friendship in 
Nietzsche’s philosophy and in his life, and in doing so, I aim to establish the need to 
inquire further into “friendship” within the work of Nietzsche.  Friendship is woven into 
the elemental aspects of his philosophy: he addresses friendship and relationship in 
numerous places of his works, he philosophizes for his friends, and he held relationships 
that were philosophically meaningful.  The argument here is that Nietzsche’s conception 
of friendship is an important aspect within Nietzschean studies, and the attention that he 
gives to friendship suggests that the next important question is to ask exactly “what is 
Nietzsche’s conception of friendship?”   To answer this question I will interpret and 
analyze the passages that I understand as formative of Nietzsche’s conception of 
friendship, while, on Kaufmann’s advice, take into consideration the breadth of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy.68  Answering the question: “what is Nietzsche’s friendship,” 
however, readdresses why a study of his friendship is valuable: Nietzsche’s friendship is, 
in a sense, implicitly moral because it aims to improve both the friend and the befriended.  
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- Chapter Two - 
Nietzsche’s Conception of Friendship 
 
The task of this chapter is to explicate what Nietzsche means by “friendship.”  
Having established the centrality of this concept for Nietzsche, in terms of textual and 
biographical evidence, this chapter will outline the key concepts within Nietzsche’s 
understanding of friendship.  For Nietzsche, healthy friendship challenges both friend and 
the befriended to honestly reexamine themself; a good friendship ‘causes one to stir.’69  
Nietzsche characterizes friendship as a progressive dialectic, in which causing another to 
suffer in some circumstances is balanced by the potential to cultivate a “higher type”. 
Before an adequate explanation of Nietzsche’s conception of friendship can be 
addressed, it is first necessary to get a sense of the way in which friendship fits with his 
philosophy of the human person.  By reading his conception of friendship as part of his 
philosophy of the human person, it will be demonstrated that friendship can be suitably 
understood as a relationship shared between natural beings.  The human being – who is 
firstly understood as an animal for Nietzsche – without a divine mission or held to 
normative moral standards, must find reasons for creating these meaningful friendships.  
As a naturalist, Nietzsche calls us to “translate man back into nature,”70 by recognizing 
and reevaluating the basic animality of humanity.  Disregarding all unsubstantiated and 
self-alienating metaphysical claims of humanity’s transcendent importance, Nietzsche 
concludes that a person is firstly an animal and has evolved out of a more primordial 
animal.  Social relationships (and friendships, in particular) play an integral role in a 
person’s development and ultimately in the progression of humanity.   
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A. Human Being as Animal 
  
Nietzsche demonstrates that he holds a particular interest in human nature, and 
current scholars, for example, Richard Schacht, have argued that Nietzsche’s philosophy 
of the human person signifies one of his principal philosophical interests.  Schacht 
characterizes Nietzsche as primarily concerned with “human nature, human life, and 
human possibility.”71  The inquiry into the basic animality of “der Mensch” is first 
examined in Human, All Too Human72 but returns as a significant theme in most of his 
subsequent works.73  Moreover, before understanding his revaluation of values and the 
nuances of the Übermensch, it is important to recognize that before anything else, the 
human animal is a product of nature.  The animality of humans becomes most clear in the 
context of being a refutation of prior, lofty philosophies of the human person which rely 
on the “metaphysical birdcatchers.”74  For Nietzsche, philosophers misconstrue peoples’ 
real existence when they are accorded reason and “spirit” as a transcendental or divine 
characteristic.  As a result of these prior philosophies, humanity has wrongly become 
preoccupied with “beautiful, glittering, jingling, festive words: honesty, love of truth, 
love of wisdom, sacrifice for knowledge, heroism of the truthful.”75  In contrast, 
Nietzsche writes that:  
But we hermits and marmots have long persuaded ourselves in the full 
secrecy of a hermit’s conscience that this worthy verbal pomp, too, 
belongs to the old mendacious pomp, junk, and gold dust of unconscious 
human vanity, and that under such flattering colors and make-up as well, 
the basic text of homo natura must again be recognized.  
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To translate man back into nature; to become master over the many vain 
and overly enthusiastic interpretations and connotations that have so far 
been scrawled and painted over that eternal basic text of homo natura; to 
see to it that man henceforth stands before man as even today, hardened in 
the discipline of science, he stands before the rest of nature, with intrepid 
Oedipus eyes and sealed Odysseus ears, deaf to siren songs of old 
metaphysical bird catchers who have been piping at him all too long, “you 
are more, you are higher, you are of a different origin!”76 
 
For Nietzsche, the nature of an individual is a product of specific temporal, social and 
natural constraints.  In this sense, one cannot refer to an inclusive, general “human 
nature,” but only to the nature of specific persons whose natures derive from social 
upbringing, experiences in the world, and the reality of being an animal – dependent on 
food and shelter and dictated, by biological processes.77  Nietzsche argues that any other 
assertion about human nature holds persons accountable to a normative or transcendental 
ideal that is foreign to our “all too human” existence.78  Kaufmann succinctly articulates 
Nietzsche’s critical distinction in contrast to Christian theology: “The monotheism of a 
Normalgott (“God”) suggests that there is a Normalmensch (“standard human nature”): a 
norm to which all men must conform and a bar to the development of individuality.”79   
A human being, before anything else, is an animal, constituted of instinct, 
biological and physiological processes, and it is captive to the demands required to 
survive in nature.  It has been a tendency of earlier theologies and metaphysical 
philosophies to grant human beings transcendental and untenable qualities.80  Clearly 
though, a person is not simply “animal” but rather, as Nietzsche asserts throughout his 
work, human beings have the faculties of reason, language and self-consciousness.  For 
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Nietzsche, a human being is not simply animal but a culmination of highly-evolved and 
developed organic forces.  Nietzsche claims that human beings live in a tension between 
being animal and something more sublime, so as to remain in a process of transcending 
their primal nature.  He captures the tension of human development in Zarathustra when 
he writes that “man is a rope, tied between beast and Übermensch…”81  For Nietzsche, 
persons are trapped into their animal nature but they also have the potential to develop 
into something more than a well-adapted animal. 
Similar to the rest of the animal kingdom, human beings evolve like animals but 
in gaining consciousness and reason, they no longer rely on simple survival instincts and 
so they have become a unique being.  Consciousness, for example, allows a person to 
develop reason and language, and most significantly, through consciousness, they now 
have the potential to give context and to gain understanding of their instinctual drives.  
Their primordial instincts – products of evolution – still function as basic drives within 
human beings, however, it is when they realize that they can now choose to follow or to 
ignore these instincts, that they become something more than animal and develop an 
“illness.”82  
This new “illness” drives the human being’s development beyond the basic 
survival nature of an animal: 
Man was bound to contract under the stress of the most fundamental 
change he ever experienced – that change which occurred when he found 
himself finally enclosed within the walls of society and of peace.  The 
situation that faced sea animals when they were compelled to become land 
animals or perish was the same as that which faced these semi-animals, 
well adapted to their wilderness, to war, to prowling, to adventure: 
suddenly all their instincts were disvalued and ‘suspended.’  From now on 
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they had to walk on their feet and ‘bear themselves’ whereas hitherto they 
had been borne by the water: a dreadful heaviness lay upon them … In this 
new world [men] no long possessed their former guides, their regulating, 
unconscious and infallible drives: they were reduced to thinking, inferring, 
reckoning, coordinating cause and effect, these unfortunate creatures; they 
were reduced to their ‘consciousness,’ their weakest and most fallible 
organ!83  
 
Human beings’ illness rejects their outgrown primordial instincts, causing the maturation 
of consciousness and reason; this is the state of the current human animal.  In realizing 
the ‘entangled web of social relations,’ a human being gains awareness of the world and 
of her situation in the world, which is mediated by consciousness and reason.84 
Through consciousness and reason, human beings have the ability to generate 
morals, religions and various other ideals, according to Nietzsche.  While animals remain 
content in their own nature, humanity continues to live in a “mere bundle of unfulfilled 
possibilities of ‘indeterminate nature,’ and the self ‘abounds in contradictory evaluations 
and, consequently, in contradictory desires.’”85  While evolving, human beings now find 
themselves caught between the tension of declining back toward mere animality and 
transcending into something more.   
 Nietzsche leads us to the conclusion that a human being is a collection of natural 
forces, “molded through the impress of his heredity and the dialectic of his prior 
encounters with our environizing natural, social and cultural world.”86  Unlike animals, 
who act in accordance with their evolved nature and laws of their species, “man is ‘the 
animal that is still not fixed,’” without a determined nature.87  The tension in which 
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human beings find themselves is not a dualism, but a situation with conflicting and 
opposing lures and forces.  For he is “not only ‘creature’ (‘material, excess, clay, dirt, 
nonsense, chaos’) but [he is] also ‘creator, form giver, hammer hardness, spectator, 
divinity and seventh day.’”88  In Nietzsche’s account, human beings and humanity 
develop according to the historical context, and in the sense, neither a person nor “human 
nature” is fixed, immutable essences that transcend time.89  Moreover, Nietzsche’s 
conclusions are distinctly different to the human nature of Plato or Aristotle, for example, 
who understood all of humanity, regardless of time, as essentially the same.  This 
difference in human nature bears critical implications on how one understands friendship.  
If a philosopher understands human nature to be essential, timeless and fixed, then the 
aim of friendship is to refine one another into the more perfected state of nature.  This 
sense of humanity is characteristic of the classical Platonist, Aristotelian and Christian 
views of the world.  In contrast, Nietzsche – who understands human nature to be 
dependent upon history and full of potential – prescribes friendship as an element of the 
development of a person, incorporating elements of conflict and pain, and lacks specific 
goals (as they are not yet known.)  Nietzsche, in contrast to Aristotle or Plato for 
example, develops his conception of human nature in terms of natural drives and how a 
person evolves, and his treatment is more of a historical psychology than a philosophy of 
human nature.  The implication here is that Nietzsche does not hold humanity 
accountable to an archetype but understood humanity’s development to be a dynamic 
process, driven by the reactions of persons as they experience themselves and other 
natural constraints.  Whereas Aristotle concluded that persons lead the good and virtuous 
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life when they act in accordance with a human’s natural disposition, moderating between 
any extreme tendencies, Nietzsche understood people to be captive to their natural 
constraints and without a telos.  Moreover, for Aristotle, the good life results in happiness 
and avoids pain; however, Nietzsche believes that if a person is to grow into his higher-
type being, then her or his life will contain elements of pain and suffering.  
What distinguishes human from animal in Nietzsche’s philosophy is a worthwhile 
discussion; however, for this paper, it is only important to establish that human beings are 
moldable, and they have the potential to develop more complicated attributes (or what 
Nietzsche might call “higher type traits”) or regress back into a more primordial state of 
existence.  Furthermore, included within the constitution of influences that make up a 
person is friendship.  I will address how relationships affect the development of a person 
in the following section.  
- 40-  
B. Relationships and the Development of the Human Being 
 
 Nietzsche argues that a human being, being a constitution of different natural 
influences, is a continually evolving product of various social, environmental and 
genealogical influences.  Of all these influences, however, a person’s relationship to 
others is perhaps the most efficacious, (particularly in the development of consciousness 
and conscience.)90  For Nietzsche, the human animal remained beast until it became 
necessary to live in a community, and it was at this point – in the presence of other beings 
– that communication and an individual self-awareness evolved.91  Moreover, the 
importance of the relationship in the development of consciousness is not limited to the 
transition between the animal-species homo sapien and the thinking, moralizing self-
conscious man of modern times; rather, Nietzsche evaluates relationships in terms of 
their capacity to cultivate the “herd” as well as aspiring Übermenschen.  (Nietzsche 
explains that community and relationships have a variety of adverse effects on persons, 
including the potential to dull the mind and to perpetuate a general life-denying social 
mediocrity.)92  I will later show that, for Nietzsche, a friend plays a pivotal role in the 
cultivation of self and others.  Before focusing solely on friendship, however, I will 
consider how relationships (including friendships) affect the development of a person.  
My aim here is to demonstrate that Nietzsche saw relationships as largely influential in 
the basic characteristics of humans.    
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In the following passage Nietzsche discusses the importance of shared experience 
in the development of communication: 
Assuming next that need has ever brought close to one another only such 
human beings as could suggest with similar signs similar requirements and 
experiences, it would follow on the whole that easy communicability of 
need – which in the last analysis means the experience of merely average 
and common experiences – must have been the most powerful of all 
powers at whose disposal man has been so far.93   
 
The potency of common experience and community is demonstrated throughout 
Nietzsche’s works, particularly in regard to consciousness, language and pejorative 
morality.94  Moreover, it is as a result of socialization that humans became more than 
animal.  Nietzsche argues that consciousness, language and morality all result from the 
human animals’ need to express distress, implore help and make themselves 
understood.95   
 There are several uniquely human characteristics that result out of relationship, 
community and socialization.  For example, human consciousness and language, 
Nietzsche suggests, are essential human characteristics that originated out of an animals 
attempt to give meaning to the frustrations of being animal.  Having established a 
common expression of distress and frustration, humans created a meaningful language by 
expressing that which is common in the “all-to-human” existence.96  Nietzsche again 
explicitly posits the critical function of common experience in the case of human 
language:  
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It is not sufficient to use the same words in order to understand one 
another: we must also employ the same words for the same kind of 
internal experiences, we must in the end have experiences in common.  
On this account the people of one nation understand one another 
better than those belonging to different nations, even when they use the 
same language; or rather, when people have lived long together under 
similar conditions (of climate, soil, danger, requirement, toil) there 
originates there from an entity that “understands itself ”—namely, a 
nation. In all souls a like number of frequently recurring experiences have 
gained the upper hand over those occurring more rarely: about these 
matters people understand one another rapidly and always more rapidly—
the history of language is the history of a process of abbreviation; on the 
basis of this quick comprehension people always unite closer and closer.97 
 
In the case of language, the socialization of human beings produces a tool that allows for 
their further cultivation.  It is through language that human beings express their 
perspective on experience, and thus identifying with other’s all-too-human plots in the 
world.  The fundamental point Nietzsche makes here is critical for this discussion: a 
person’s relationship to another person is a critical element in a person’s development 
from animal to human and from human to Übermensch.   
While language and the ability to communicate evolve out the need to relate to 
others, Nietzsche makes clear that this development is not a “good” in itself.   Nietzsche 
treats the development of language similar to how he treats other aspects of humanity and 
nature: ideas that are often deemed “good” (in the sense that it has cultivating value) are 
juxtaposed with its harmful value.  Language, for example, gave humans the capacity to 
communicate understanding; however, Nietzsche also argues that language limits 
understanding.  Nietzsche’s attitude towards the benefits and limitations of language 
parallels the central theme of Nietzsche’s view of friendship in that nothing is 
intrinsically “good” or “evil” but all things are often judged in terms of being either good 
or evil.  In the case of community, language, consciousness, relationship and friendship, 
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all have instances of being beneficial to the cultivation of a “higher-type” of humans and 
corresponding instances that cause a regression of persons.  Nietzsche often characterizes 
things as both healthful and harmful, “good” and “bad,” and some scholars of Nietzsche 
have attributed this theme to having been influenced by the early Greek philosopher 
Heraclitus.98  (The evidence for this Heraclitean theme in Nietzsche’s writing is far too 
expansive to be adequately addressed in this discussion.  Yet establishing the importance 
of this theme is critical for understanding the essential nature of Nietzsche’s views on 
“friendship.”)  The inseparability of suffering with triumph, health with harm, strife with 
joy, “Mitfreude” with “Mitleiden” frames how Nietzsche understands the nature of an 
all-too-human existence, including the nature of human relationships. 99   
Likewise, for Nietzsche, the development of a person requires a painful process in 
which suffering results in health.  To explain this idea, Nietzsche uses pregnancy as a 
metaphor, in which life resolves out of a painful process: as pregnancy includes “illness” 
and pain before a woman gives birth to new life, the natural development of a person 
includes elements of conflict, tension and pain – ie. “illnesses.”100   Like pregnancy, 
Nietzsche advises that a friend is not only a source of pleasure and companionship, but in 
order for a friend to aid in the development of an other self, a friend is also a source of 
tension.  It is within the context of this theme that I will begin to discuss how Nietzsche 
explicitly deals with “friendship.” 
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C. Nietzsche’s Conception of Friendship 
 In the previous section I situated Nietzsche’s attitude to friendship within his 
philosophy of the human being and suggested that his understanding of the value of 
friendship is similar to how he values nature and language.  Here I will show that 
Nietzsche’s “friendship” is a relationship shared between persons in which the aim is to 
cultivate the natural potential in firstly oneself and secondly in the other.  In addition, 
Nietzsche also adds that friendship cannot be rooted in pejorative moral standards or an 
agenda to selflessly “love” the other or an expression of altruism.  Nietzsche argues that 
friendship rooted in standards and ideals relies on something beyond the limitations of 
our all-too-human existence.  Rather, Nietzsche’s friendship is not fundamentally selfless 
but a friend invests in the relationship because he is firstly self-interested.  To become a 
friend or to befriend another reflects the contemptuous processes of nature: the evolution 
in nature is not an attempt to achieve a perfect world, animal or human, but a forceful 
development necessitated by the insufficiency of the current state.  Likewise, Nietzsche’s 
“friends” are not imitating ideal “friendship,” but recognize the interplay of power and 
the value of conflict.101   
 “On the Friend” from Thus Spoke Zarathustra represents Nietzsche’s unequivocal 
treatment of friendship.  Here, while the importance of the Übermensch is overtly 
expressed compared to earlier works, Nietzsche posits the central value of the 
“Heraclitean” strife102 in friendship: 
 
If one want to have a friend one must also want to wage war 
for him: and to wage war, one must be capable of being an enemy.  In 
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a friend one should still honor the enemy.  Can you go close to your 
friend without going over to him? 
In a friend one should have one’s best enemy.  You should be 
closest to him with your heart when you resist him… 
Compassion for the friend should conceal itself under a hard 
shell, and you should break a tooth on it.  That way it will have 
delicacy and sweetness… 
Are you a slave? Then you cannot be a friend.  Are you a 
tyrant?  Then you cannot have friends.103 
 
The value of conflict between friends, for Nietzsche, is coupled with honest concern and 
the aim to cultivate.  The temptation of a friend is to always be agreeable, sacrificing 
one’s true opinions and convictions to avoid conflict with another.  This is a legitimate 
temptation, for to become disagreeable and antagonizing means risking a relationship in 
which one is typically valued and affirmed.  For Nietzsche, these types of affirmations 
demonstrate a lack of character, weakness and they are characteristic of the ‘lower-type 
mentality.’104 
 Most central to Nietzsche’s friendship is the aim of cultivating the attributes of 
the Übermensch.  For Nietzsche, a friendship entails cultivation of the friend and the 
befriended through a progressive dialectic.  Here friends find fault in each other and then 
challenge one another, aiming to improve both themselves and their friend.  Walter 
Kaufmann develops this theme in his short treatment of Nietzsche’s “friendship.”105  
Using Daybreak §503 and The Gay Science §14 as examples, Kaufmann concludes that 
“no other modern philosopher has tried so hard to re-experience the spirit of Socrates and 
his disciples” – the “spirit,” he posits, of Plato’s Symposium.106  Kaufman interprets the 
Socratic “spirit” of friendship” – or “love” in the Symposium – as “fruitful [when] two 
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persons strive together to perfect themselves and each other.”107  He further argues that 
Nietzsche fully demonstrates this spirit of friendship in Zarathustra, noting that “’the 
common thirst for an ideal above’ has become a common ‘longing for the 
Übermenschen’”108   
 Similar to the spirit of inspiring “the good” and “the beautiful” in Plato’s 
Symposium, the aim of Nietzsche’s friend is to cultivate the potential of others.  His 
“friendship,” however, only resembles this Greek love in the method of cultivating.  
Thus, it is worth further examination to elucidate the similarities between Socratic “love 
and Nietzsche’s “friendship.”  Firstly, Nietzsche supplies ample evidence to support a 
relation between these ideas.  In addition to the passages cited by Kaufmann, Nietzsche 
refers to Greek friendship and love in a variety of other passages.  For instance, in 
Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche remarks: “The Greeks, who knew so well what a 
friend is (they alone of all peoples have a deep, many-sided, philosophical discussion of 
friendship; so that they are the first, and thus far are the last, to consider the friend as a 
problem worthy of solution)…”109  Nietzsche, however, is not simply rekindling the same 
spirit of Greek friendship, and acknowledging limitations in this treatment. 110  Nietzsche, 
rather, is suggesting that friendship is a combination of pure and impure motives, and that 
a friend may aim to cultivate another, but he may also desire to control the other.  “Here 
and there on earth we may encounter a kind of continuation of love in which this 
possessive craving of two people for each other gives way to a new desire and lust for 
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possession – a shared higher thirst for an ideal above them.  But who knows such love?  
Who has experienced it?  Its right name is friendship…”111  Common to both Socratic 
love and friendship is the aim to better oneself another through discourse.  It is a 
misreading, however, to translate across the “thirst for ideals” in Socratic love to a 
“longing for the Übermensch” in Nietzsche.  The similarities between the progressive 
dialectic “spirit” in Socratic love and Nietzsche’s “friendship” is supported in several 
passages in his work.112  To further elucidate the nature of cultivation, however, requires 
an examination of Nietzsche’s discussion of conflict, hardness, disputation, 
argumentation and sublimation in relationship.   
 Most basic to Nietzsche’s understanding of cultivation is the notion that tension 
and inadequacy drive the evolution of nature and the improvement of the human animal.  
It is when the human person experiences suffering and frustration that he or she explores 
the means to improve upon her present situation.  Without the suffering and frustration, 
Nietzsche argues that there would be no compulsion to improve.113  The necessity of 
suffering and conflict is made clear, for example in Beyond Good and Evil §44:  
We opposite men, having opened an eye and a conscience to the question 
where and how the plant “man” has so far grown most vigorously to a 
height, we think that this has happened every time under the opposite 
conditions, that to this end the dangerousness of his situation must first 
grow to the point of enormity, his power of invention and disguise (his 
“spirit”—) had to develop under prolonged pressure and constraint into 
refinement and audacity, his life-will had to be enhanced into an 
unconditional power-will:—we think that hardness, violence, slavery, 
danger in the alley and the heart, life in hiding, stoicism, the art of the 
tempter and devilry of every kind, that everything evil, terrible, tyrannical, 
like beasts of prey and snake-like in man serves the enhancement of the 
species “man” as much as its opposite does:—indeed, we do not even say 
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enough when we say only that much, and at any rate we are at this point, 
in what we say and keep silent about, at the other end from all modern 
ideology and herd desiderata – as their antipodes perhaps?114 
 
Nietzsche’s valuation of opposites places crucial importance on all things that challenge 
the human species.  For it is through overcoming hardship that a person is refined.  
Moreover, the primacy of strife in progression sheds light on Nietzsche’s paradoxical 
assertion: “Friends, there are no friends! … Enemies, there is no enemy!”115  The 
relationship of friends is one where both laughter and contempt are worth welcoming.  
Reflecting a larger theme in his philosophy, Nietzsche deconstructs the typical evaluation 
that friends are implicitly “good” and enemies implicitly “bad,” rather it is the case that 
both friends and enemies are beneficial and harmful to self-cultivation.116  
 To develop one’s self, then, requires that a person remain open to criticism and 
embracing hardship as opportunities for growth.  Criticism and contradiction are not 
instances of defeat and hurt feelings, but rather, Nietzsche argues, these are opportunities 
to cultivate greatness, liberation and high culture: 
Everybody knows nowadays that the ability to accept criticism and 
contradiction is a sign of high culture… But the ability to contradict, the 
attainment of a good conscience when one feels hostile to what is 
accustomed, traditional, and hallowed – that is still more excellent and 
constitutes what is really great, new, and amazing in our culture; this is the 
step of steps of the liberated spirit: Who knows that?117 
 
Moreover, Nietzsche explicitly argues that the arguments and conflicts endured between 
friends play a necessary role for the cultivation of oneself.  This is the role of a friend in a 
person’s life: to become an opposite when the other no longer aims to improve herself.  
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Nietzsche poetically explicates this idea in a prose entitled “Heraclitean” in The Gay 
Science: 
Only fights yield 
Happiness on earth, 
And on battlefields 
Friendship has its birth. 
One in three are friends: 
Brothers in distress, 
Equals, facing foes, 
Free – when facing death!118 
 
In coupling friendship with the warring of the battlefield, this Heraclitean theme is further 
emphasized. 
The friend helps cultivate the human spirit by identifying life-affirming “drives” 
in both him or her and the befriended.  In becoming an opposite or an enemy, the friend 
establishes an opinion that fundamentally declares ‘I believe your position is inferior and 
harmful.’  The friend gains a greater sense of her strength,119 and the befriended either 
contends the assertion or accepts the fault in her own position.  Both, however, benefit 
when criticism instigates self-examination and cultivates new perspectives.120  
Cultivating criticism, Nietzsche suggests, is personal and affirming: “… when we 
criticize something, this is no arbitrary and impersonal event; it is, at least very often, 
evidence of vital energies within us.  We negate and must negate because something in us 
wants to live and affirm – something that we perhaps do not know or see as yet.”121  A 
friend, Nietzsche argues, provides the necessary perspective that is needed for one to 
‘look away from oneself’ and to see that which requires cultivation.122  The friend is 
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particularly efficacious in changing the other because a friend knows the other well.  A 
unique characteristic of a friend, in contrast to an acquaintance or colleague, is that a 
friend discloses certain sides and vulnerabilities that are likely unknown to others.  A 
friend, therefore, has critical insight into the state of his befriended, putting him in a 
position that allows him to be distinctively efficacious in changing the other.   
With new perspective and self-awareness, the friend is also importantly instrumental in 
instigating the potent creativity that is characteristic of the “free spirit.”  Nietzsche pays 
particular attention to criticism directed at the “herd conscience,” and argues that a friend 
who criticizes obtrusiveness, laziness, weakness and crudeness – all life-denying 
characteristics of the herd – is one who becomes a creator of new values.123  In this case, 
critical “drives” that were traditionally thought to be harmful, now have important 
cultivating value.  For example, “foolhardiness, revengefulness, craft, rapacity, and 
ambition,” which are often characterized as harmful, also reject the “herd conscience:”  
When the highest and strongest drives, breaking passionately out, carry the 
individual far above and beyond the average and lowlands of the herd 
conscience, the self-confidence of the community goes to pieces, its faith 
in itself, its spine as it were, is broken: consequently it is precisely these 
drives which are most branded and calumniated. Lofty spiritual 
independence, the will to stand alone, great intelligence even, are felt to be 
dangerous.124  
 
In this sense these harmful drives are also valuable when they cause one to criticize 
pejorative social standards.  This is not to say that these incendious values are strictly 
more important than other, seemingly contrasting values such as forgiveness and pity.  
Even in Nietzsche’s understanding, these traditional moral values are helpful because 
they maintain a certain amount of order in society.  In contrast, the “strong and dangerous 
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drives” have important “social utility” because they drive the revaluation of values.  In 
Nietzsche’s opinion, the development of humanity is dependent upon persons who call 
into question these traditional values that promote mediocrity and moral dullness.125  
While traditional more values maintain social order, these values have also run their 
course, and so it is now humanity’s task to revaluate the moral institutions that restrict 
humanity’s growth.  Without critical friendships, persons remain vulnerable to the life-
denying ways of the herd.  As Nietzsche advises, a human being is often unknown to 
himself until he responds to the critical and honest examinations of another: 
Self-observation.— Man is very well defended against himself, against his 
own spying and sieges; usually he is able to make out no more of himself 
than his outer fortifications. The actual stronghold is inaccessible to him, 
even invisible, unless friends and enemies turn traitor and lead him there 
by a secret path.126 
 
Nietzsche argues that the conflict in relationships allow one to recognize the obtrusive 
values that hinder him from developing perspective and creativity, (values he associates 
with the “higher type.”)   
Nietzsche further articulates the value of “warring” in friendship in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra:  
We do not want to be spared by our best enemies, nor by those 
whom we love thoroughly.  So let me tell you the truth! 
My brothers in war, I love you thoroughly; I am and I was of your 
kind.  And I am also your best enemy.  So let me tell you the truth! 
I know of the hatred and envy of your hearts.  You are not great 
enough not to know hatred and envy.  Be great enough, then, not to be 
ashamed of them… 
You should have eyes that always seek an enemy – your enemy.  
And some of you hate at first sight.  Your enemy you shall seek, your war 
you shall wage – for your thoughts.  And if your thought be vanquished, 
then your honesty should still find cause for triumph in that.  You should 
love peace as a means to new wars – and the short peace more than the 
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long.  To you I do not recommend peace but victory.  Let your work be a 
struggle.  Let your peace be a victory.  One can be silent and sit still only 
when one has bow and arrow: else one chatters and quarrels.  Let your 
peace be a victory.  
You say it is the good cause that hallows even war?  I say unto 
you: it is the good war that hallows any cause.  War and courage have 
accomplished more great things than love the neighbor.  Not your pity but 
your courage has so far the unfortunate… 
You may have only enemies whom you can hate, not enemies you 
despise.  You must be proud of your enemy: then the successes of your 
enemy are your successes too…  
Thus live your life of obedience and war.  What matters long life?  
What warrior wants to be spared?   
I do not spare you; I love you thoroughly, my brothers in war!127 
 
The contentious relationships of Übermenschen reside in warring, filled with multiple 
perspectives and conducive to creativity.  Nietzsche makes the analogy that the spirited 
tension between fellow free spirits is similar to tension between the vaults and arches of 
architectural masterpieces, filled with “assurance and beauty.”128  As vaulted arches are 
magnificent in being supported with great amounts of tension, a person is refined into 
greatness when an analogous tension is thrust upon him by friends.  
 In relating friends to enemies, Nietzsche demonstrates the value in looking 
beyond traditional assessments of friendship.  Whereas enemies are evaluated in terms of 
the hurt they inflict upon another and friends are evaluated in terms of good brought to 
the befriended, Nietzsche argues that his audience must revaluate the value of enemies 
and friends.  The passages cited above further suggest that for Nietzsche, enemies are 
often more capable of cultivating the potential in one another and that friends are 
suspiciously harmful to the development of a person when they coddle one another with 
compassion and charity.  Nietzsche’s view complicates the seemingly antithetical nature 
of enemies and friends by charging friends “to go to war” against one another and 
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warning that love can make one “barbaric” like an enemy.129  (For Nietzsche, love 
becomes barbaric when one obsesses over the beloved.)  This complication, however, 
calls into question the plausibility of Nietzsche’s friendship, as a warring friend seems 
counterintuitive to most persons’ understanding of friendship.  Nietzsche aims to resolve 
this complication by arguing that the common understanding of friendship, in which 
friends demonstrates care for the other and avoid “warring,” is an understanding rooted in 
a misinterpretation of the actual relationship.  In Nietzsche’s interpretation of friendship, 
friends are not as wholly invested as they appear to act, and conversely, enemies do not 
entirely hate each other.130  For Nietzsche’s claim to stand close scrutiny, it requires that 
he further explain how friends who war with another are also invested in the well-being 
of one another and maintain an actual friendship.  (Nietzsche indicates that the reality of 
warring friends is a reality yet to be actualized and reserved only for the Übermenschen.)   
In addition, the complication of the enemy-friend also demonstrates a consistency 
within his philosophy that in order for humans and humanity to evolve, it is necessary to 
revaluate what is valued as “good” and what is valued as “bad.”  Nietzsche’s friendship, 
integral to the development of humans, is also harmful when pandering to weakness and, 
it is healthful when it utilizes painful, incisive honesty to help one recognize their 
weaknesses.  Nietzsche’s juxtaposition of friends and enemies builds on his theory that 
the development of humans and humanity are driven through a process that is painful and 
sometimes destructive.  He also demonstrates that for humans to develop, it is further 
necessary to revaluate the value of seemingly “good” and “bad” effects in one’s life.  
Nietzsche has only constructed a convincing case for a new type of friendship, however, 
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if it is actually plausible for friends to “war,” criticize and behave like enemies, yet 
maintain enough decency within the relationship such that persons trust in their friends’ 
concern.  Nietzsche’s friendship is not only contentious and painful but he is even more 
unorthodox in his views by emphasizing the value of friends being self-interested.  Thus, 
it is further necessary to explore the plausibility of an actual Nietzschean friendship by 
questioning how a friendship will subsist without the compassion, altruism and intimacy 
contained in traditional conceptions of friendship.  
- 55-  
D.  Self-Interestedness and Instrumentality 
 
Through disputation and criticism, the free-spirited friend aims firstly to improve 
himself.131  Unlike Socratic love in which the friend challenges the other because it is 
intrinsically good to inspire love for higher goods, Nietzschean friendship is based in 
egoistic motives.  Moreover, distinctly antithetical to the Kantian morality, Nietzsche 
posits a form of friendship in which friends are not treated as ends in themselves.  Friends 
can only have instrumental value because a person is only capable of being self-
interested, Nietzsche argues, and those who claim to be “selfless” are being dishonest 
with themselves.  Nietzsche responds to moralities (like Kant’s, which argue for a 
person’s individual rights or value) by suggesting that these moralities deny that persons 
are fundamentally interested in protecting themselves.  While a person may claim to act 
selflessly and to treat others as ends (rather than means), it is impossible to believe that 
they are more interested in the other than their own self.   
Like Kant, Aristotle raises concerns about friends who are used as means to an 
end.  Aristotle distinguishes between those philia (friendships) who are treated 
instrumentally and those who are valued in-themselves.  For Aristotle, instrumental philia 
(as Pedro Tabensky refers to this type of Aristotelian friendship) are less desirable than 
virtue friendships because the utility of the friendship is valued more than the friendship 
itself.132  As Aristotle explains, instrumental philia are self-interested: 
Therefore, those who love for the sake of utility love for the sake of what 
is good for themselves, and those who love for the sake of pleasure do so 
for the sake of what is pleasant to themselves, and no in so far as the other 
is the person loved but in so far as he is useful or pleasant.133 
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At the heart of Aristotle’s claim is the concern that instrumental philia are fundamentally 
dishonest because their interest in one another is dependent upon their degree of utility.  
Moreover, any action deriving from dishonest motives lacks virtue.  Nietzsche, too, 
similarly values honesty but he argues that it is impossible for a person to honestly act 
selfless.  Rather than acting selfless, Nietzsche advocates that friends ought to concede 
that their concern for one another is limited by each owns self-interestedness.  Having 
acknowledged their motives, friends are able to move forward in the relationship, trusting 
that both parties are now being honest with one another – honestly selfish.  Here 
Nietzsche’s conception of friendship is dependent upon the premise that persons are first 
self-interested and unable to act selflessly.  
The selfishness that Nietzsche posits, however, is not a maniacal egocentrism or a 
form of Hedonism.  Rather it is a self-interestedness that benefits others in cultivating 
one’s own character, as it is expressed here: “I teach you the friend and his overflowing 
heart.  But one must learn to be a sponge if one wants to be loved by hearts that 
overflow.”134  When one has an abundance of creativity and exudes other higher-type 
traits, then he has the capacity to honestly befriend another.  An unready friend – one 
who is both needy and parasitic has the potential to dull another and stifle creativity by 
being pitiful and demanding attention.135  
The egoism in Nietzsche’s friendship is rooted in his view that persons have the 
potential to develop, and a certain amount of egoism is central to the development of 
persons.  Nietzsche is careful to distinguish between an egoism in which a person is 
naturally self-absorbed in a form of narcissism and the self-interestedness that he 
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associates with the Übermensch.  Egoism as self-obsession is enslaving in the sense that 
persons are unable to understand anything beyond themselves.  Nietzsche, in contrast, 
advocates that persons who learn to understand others are given the reciprocated 
opportunity to learn about themselves.  He explains that persons are capable of 
maintaining their own self-interestedness and investing in understanding others to a 
healthy degree, only if their relationships provide them with a different perspective of 
themselves.  Here again Nietzsche is unorthodox in his conception of friendship by 
maintaining that a person’s care for a friend is slightly insincere because the care is 
mediated by an underlying self-interestedness.  In this form of higher-type egoism, a 
person does not live to please others or for others, but developed persons “give style to 
their character” by living for themselves.  Furthermore, in Nietzsche’s organic account of 
humanity, human development is driven by the individual efforts of persons who react to 
the frustrations and constraints in their lives; for Nietzsche, this task is dependent on the 
fact that a person is firstly self-interested.  This conclusion, however, may have several 
problematic implications. 
A critical difference between Aristotle’s “orthodox” friendship and Nietzsche’s 
friendship is the most apparent when considering how friendship affects other people.  
For Aristotle, friendships represent the smallest subcategories of societies, and in this 
sense, friendship is fundamentally political and how a person interacts with their friends 
has larger societal repercussions.136  Nietzsche’s treatment of friendship, in contrast, 
seems to be strictly apolitical, without reference to the larger implications on society.  
(Moreover, Nietzsche’s philosophy in general seems to be apolitical.137)  While divergent 
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in their implications, however, both Nietzsche and Aristotle derive their understanding 
from similar premises.  For instance, both Nietzsche and Aristotle understand persons to 
be natural beings, affected by their environment, including the natural world in which 
they live, their society, community and friends.138  Moreover, Nietzsche, like Aristotle, 
suggests that friends hold a particularly unique role in effecting the moral development of 
others.139   
 The contrasts between Nietzsche and Aristotle conclusions (despite holding 
similar premises) represent their fundamentally different philosophical aims, specifically 
in terms of morality.  For Aristotle, moral (virtuous) action leads to both personal 
happiness and subsequently, political happiness, and this is the telos of persons: to live 
virtuously.140  Thus, it follows from Aristotle’s aims that friends play a critical role in 
building a virtuous moral state, as both friendship and the political state share the same 
moral ends.  (For Aristotle, justice, or just action, is a primary virtue that connects 
friendship and the state.)  Nietzsche’s interest in morality, in contrast, pertains to the 
development of individuals (ie. human flourishing) and he clearly demonstrates that he is 
not interested in constructing a system which would instruct individuals how to be moral.  
Accordingly, for Nietzsche, the aim of friendship is ambiguous in terms of specific moral 
gains.  (For example, Nietzsche does not argue that friendship develops justice, 
selflessness or any other specific virtue.)  Nietzsche does find value in friendship; the 
value of friendship, however, is limited to the betterment of individuals, friendship does 
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not have a traceable political value, and friendship is a not a subcategory of 
encompassing morality.  
While Nietzsche is keen to describe the motivations and psyche of persons and 
the temperament of society, he is not interested in theorizing on politics.141  Positing the 
view that humans are firstly self-interested, however, has certain implications which are 
directly pertinent to how a society functions.  Thus, it is worthwhile to consider how 
these problematic implications might call into account the plausibility of Nietzsche’s 
human nature.  For instance, if a community consists of persons who have realized their 
self-interestedness, then it is hard to imagine how the community would organize and 
represent the variety of persons’ interests.  It seems unlikely that a community of self-
interested persons would remain honest to their self-interestedness while also complying 
with their community’s needs.  This implication illustrates that Nietzsche’s philosophical 
interests were limited (and did not include politics.)   
The self-interestedness of friendship reflects one of Nietzsche’s criticisms of 
morality in the sense that altruism and acts of pity, charity and self-sacrifice are 
understood fundamentally as unnatural and thus inhuman.  Even if an altruistic utopia 
were made manifest, he predicts, the human animal would “dream of nothing but the 
happy, loveless past, of divine selfishness, of how it was once possible to be alone, 
undisturbed, unloved, hated, despised on earth, and whatever else may characterize the 
utter baseness of the dear animal in which we live.”142  As Nietzsche posits here, the all-
too-human reality of the human animal is a life that is naturally solitary, self-interested, 
and so it is worth celebrating as such.  For the self-interestedness that Nietzsche finds 
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valuable is not a self-obsession or narrow-mindedness, rather he finds value in persons 
who recognize the limits of their understanding and strive for individuality by being self-
creators.  Nietzsche’s position here, however, is one that remains to be actualized.  While 
he develops the idea of humans being self-interested throughout his works, he describes 
that the process of recognizing one’s self-interestedness is reserved for those aspiring 
Übermenschen.  If Nietzsche is to be correct in this view, then it still remains a general 
task of humanity to further understand the meaning of care and compassions – drives that 
appear can be accepted as sincere but which Nietzsche finds to be suspiciously decadent.  
Nietzsche, however, makes an important distinction between the life-denying, selfish 
drives and general good nature.  Nietzsche writes that friendliness and courtesy are 
seemingly selfless but “in fact there really is not much about them that is selfless,” and 
“have made much greater contributions to culture than those much more famous 
expressions of this drive, called pity, charity, and self-sacrifice.”143  Altruistic and selfless 
acts, rather, lack evidence in Nietzsche’s worldview and he finds that persons are firstly 
interested in themselves than anyone else.144  (He concludes that moral ideals, like 
altruism, tend to be more life-denying rather than spirit-giving.145)  Nietzsche expresses 
the unnatural and life-denying spirit of selflessness in the passage “On the Spirit of 
Gravity” in Zarathustra:  
Not, to be sure, with the love of the wilting and wasting: for among those 
even self-love stinks.  One must learn to love oneself – thus I teach – with 
a wholesome and healthy love, so that one can bear to be with oneself and 
need not roam.  Such roaming baptizes itself ‘love of the neighbor’: with 
this phrase the best lies and hypocrisies have been perpetrated so far, and 
especially by such as were a grave burden for all the world.146 
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In his rejection of selflessness and his evaluation of ego, Nietzsche argues that the 
“higher-type’s” relationship to others is selfish.  He bases this argument on three claims: 
there are no selfless actions, the ego is natural and thus good, and the selfish ego benefits 
others (particularly the other “higher-types.”) 
 For Nietzsche, even seemingly selfless actions stem from the ego.  While this 
does not rule out the possibility that a may intend to act out of selfishness, in Nietzsche’s 
view it is impossible to act purely selfless.  Arguments for altruism and selflessness, then, 
are dishonest in their understanding of human motives – in his words, “unegoistic 
[actions are] more fabulous than the phoenix.”147  For “no man has ever done anything 
that was done wholly for others and with no personal motivation whatever; how, indeed, 
should a man be able to do something that had no reference to himself, that is to say 
lacked all inner compulsion (which would have its basis in a personal need)?  How could 
the ego act without the ego?”148  Thus, to adequately understand acts of selflessness, 
particularly in the case of friendship, requires examining egoistic motives.  Yet, it is still 
the case that persons sincerely believe in selfless acts – how then does Nietzsche 
understand these actions?  These “selfless actions” are either an expression of power and 
superiority, an opportunity to receive applause, a chance to “realize how fortunate we 
are,” a relief from boredom or a desperate attempt to cure our own all-too-human 
vulnerability by helping another.149  None of these actions, though, are purely altruistic.  
 The nonexistence of selfless actions is clear in Nietzsche’s writings; it is 
additionally evident that he found egoism to be naturally healthy.  Egoism, for Nietzsche, 
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is founded in the “primordial law of things” and is part of the “nature of all social 
relations.”150  As a naturalist, then, egoism is inherently good, and so it is that there 
Nietzsche’s conception of friendship contains a normative component in that he judges 
persons to be more fulfilled in recognizing their natural motives.  In this sense, Nietzsche 
is making a value judgment similar to those whose morality he critiques.  He suggests, 
however, that he can make this judgment because he has more correctly understood the 
nature of persons while those he critiques have misinterpreted the nature of persons. 
The ego’s natural potency constitutes the “good man” because without it, he “flees from 
himself, hates himself, does harm to himself.”  Rather, the “good man” is first 
“benevolently and beneficently inclined towards himself!”151  So it is through the exercise 
of ego that the human person behaves according to his natural disposition.  
 Finally, Nietzsche draws the important implication that the egoism of the “free 
spirit” indirectly benefits other “free spirits.”  The selfless person passively relates to 
others and compromises or denies her own spirit for her companions.  In contrast, the 
“free spirit” – who appreciates the strength of the ego – exercises ego-centered drives, 
and thus instigating the combative progressive-dialectic that cultivates Übermenschen.152  
“It is an additional instance of his egoism, this artfulness and self-limitation in 
intercourse with his equals—every star is a similar egoist, he honors himself in them, and 
in the rights which he concedes to them, he has no doubt that the exchange of honors and 
rights, as the essence of all intercourse, belongs also to the natural condition of things.”153  
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Here Nietzsche explains that the egocentrism of one individual “star” is contagious and 
inspiring to other individuals with the potential for similar greatness.  
 In elucidating the critical elements of Nietzsche’s “egoism” and his rejection of 
pure selflessness, an important conclusion follows in regard to this discussion on 
friendship, that is, it is always the case that the relationship shared between two friends 
originates in a primary selfishness that seeks self-benefit.  If the “friends” are disposed 
towards the mentality of the “free spirit,” then the ego of the friend is not possessive and 
dominating, but provides an opportunity to engage in the dialectic that cultivates “higher-
type” thinking.  
 In relationship and friendship, the subjective experience of an individual is given 
primary importance in Nietzsche’s philosophy.  As indicated before, Nietzsche values the 
selfish ego of an individual as the factor that governs how a person relates to another.  In 
addition to governing how a person relates to another, Nietzsche poses the more primary 
question as to whether they should even relate to others at all.  While the human animal 
evolved out of a necessitated communal living experience, Nietzsche clearly argues for 
the value of solitude, particularly in the life of the Übermenschen.   
- 64-  
E. Solitude 
 For Nietzsche, societies on the whole and social relationships threaten to become 
restrictive – a case made throughout his works but particularly in Zarathustra.  Society is 
“poisonous” and harmful; solitude, on the other hand, is where the air is “raw and 
strong.”154  Thus, the social individual risks joining the parasitic “herd,” who develop a 
common mentality and limit creativity by establishing shared values.  Nietzsche 
articulates this in an earlier work: “When I am among the many I live as the many do, 
and I do not think as I really think; after a time it always seems as though they want to 
banish me from myself and rob me of my soul – and I grow angry with everybody and 
fear everybody.  I then require the desert, so as to grow good again.”155  Solitude is an 
opportunity to escape from this weariness, fear and frustration; Nietzsche warns, 
however, that the process of liberation is painful and uneasy.156  
 Beginning with an assertion of independence, the self who seeks solitude must be 
determined to leave the herd mentality.  As Nietzsche explains in Zarathustra, the “free 
spirit” will declare, “I will no longer have a common conscience with you.” 157  The 
declaration in itself is only the beginning of an agonizing path in which the “free spirit” 
must unlearn the common conscience and develop the ability to recognize how society 
conditions his perception of the world and himself.  Nietzsche stresses that this is 
reserved for the strongest and most spirited.158  At the point of liberation the “free spirit” 
is faced with daunting but necessary questions, calling him to be his own creator of value 
and meaning.  “Can you give yourself your own evil and your own good and hang your 
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own will over yourself as a law?  Can you be your own judge an avenger of your law?  
Terrible it is to be alone with the judge and avenger of one’s own law.  Thus is a star 
thrown out into the void and into the icy breath of solitude.”159  The “free spirits” who 
affirmatively respond ultimately face a lone existence, isolated from the comforts of 
communal life.  Those who lack the spirit to endure solitude eventually become “bored, 
disgusted, and despise themselves.”160  For these persons, “solitude becomes poison.”161 
Brian Leiter, in his book Nietzsche on Morality, thinks that a “higher person’s” 
relationship to another is always instrumental, limiting interactions with others by living 
a life of solitude.162  Nietzsche explains this, Leiter notes, in Beyond Good and Evil §273: 
“A human being who strives for something great considers everyone he meets on his way 
either as a means or as a delay and obstacle – or a temporary resting place.”  Moreover, 
“free spirits” who maintains a certain distance from their friends (like Nietzsche himself) 
learn of a deeper appreciation for their friends.  Continual proximity to friends, in 
contrast, limits the friend’s perspective on their relationship, particularly when the 
conversations and routines of the friendship remain the torpid; solitude, however, is an 
opportunity to gain perspective.  Nietzsche suggests that there is value in being reminded 
of one’s “all too human” nature and that persons becomes weary (and ultimately dulled) 
if they remain in continual company of others.  Even being in the company of one’s 
healthiest friends should be balanced with a certain amount of solitude, in Nietzsche’s 
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opinion.  “A: But why this solitude? – B: I am not at odds with anyone.  But when I am 
alone I seem to see my friends in a clearer and fairer light than when I am with them; and 
when I loved and appreciated music the most, I lived far from it.  It seems I need a distant 
perspective if I am to think well of things.”163  The temperamental nature of friendships 
has the two-fold quality of being both potentially beneficial to the friend and the 
befriended.   
Nietzsche’s positive valuation of solitude and the instrumentality of friends are 
rooted in his criticism of society.  Nietzsche criticizes the communal life as being 
conducive to dulling the creative spirit and to creating a herd instinct.164  Solitude offers 
liberation from the diseased society, allowing the “free spirit” to exercise an 
“independence of the soul.”165  Yet it is not explicitly clear that solitude in itself is 
conducive to higher-type cultivation.   
Between sociable and solitary natures there exists this distinction 
(presupposing they both possess spirit!): the former will be happy, or 
almost happy with a thing, whatever it may be, from the moment they 
have found in their spirit a communicable and pleasing way of 
expressing it – this will reconcile them to the Devil himself!  The 
solitary, however, have their enjoyment or their torment of a thing in 
silence, they hate a clever and glittering display of their innermost 
problems as they hate to see their beloved too carefully dressed: they 
gaze at her with melancholy eyes, as though becoming pretty to the 
suspicion she wants to appear pleasing to others!  This is the jealousy 
which all solitary thinkers and passionate dreamers feel towards 
esprit.166 
 
Nietzsche asks “where one should build one’s house” – in either solitude or community:  
If you feel yourself great and fruitful in solitude, a life in society will 
diminish you and make you empty: and vice versa.  Powerful gentleness, 
like that of a father: - where you are seized by this mood, there found 
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your house, whether it be in the midst of the crowd or in a silent retreat. 
Ubi pater sum, ibi patri. (Where you live well, live there.)167 
 
Furthermore, there is not sufficient evidence in Nietzsche’s work to definitively 
say that a person’s sublimation into an Übermensch is entirely independent or necessarily 
dependent on others.  Nietzsche clarifies the issue somewhat by noting that everything is 
worth sacrificing for the “independence of the soul!” – even if it requires sacrificing 
“one’s dearest friend.”168  Critical to a person’s development into becoming Übermensch-
like is the ability to overcome both the fear of being alone and the desire to live in 
community and dependent upon others.  In this respect, persons have not developed the 
self-interestedness needed to assert their own selfhood when they are driven by the 
egoistic passions like the fear of being alone, thus needing to live in community.  These 
persons obsess over their fears and they are controlled by the instincts characteristic of 
the herd.  In contrast, only those developing into the Übermenschen can overcome the 
herd instinct by recognizing their own self-interestedness and then continually calculating 
the value of living in solitude and amongst friends 
Nietzsche articulates the moderation between the solitary and communal life in 
the story of Zarathustra, who leaves his solitude, “weary with wisdom” and returns to 
community (“goes under”) to “give away and distribute… [and] become empty again.”169  
When Zarathustra realizes that he is received as the “mean between a fool and a corpse” 
and that “[his] sense does not speak to their senses,” he leaves the communal life.170  
Zarathustra toils through the cycles of solitude and an overflowing compulsion to return, 
through the conclusion of the story when he has befriended and cultivated the 
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Übermensch.  Returning to his cave once again, “he … felt a desire for the good air 
outside and for his animals – and he wanted to slip out.”  Zarathustra represents the 
balance of solitary and communal living, and relating to others both instrumentally and 
with concern.  A strict prescription for a life alone or a life in dialogue with others does 
not cultivate the spirit of the Übermensch.  Human cultivation, rather, is driven by 
reacting to the varying states of community and solitary living.  As Nietzsche advises: 
“Ubi pater sum, ibi patri” (“Where you live well, live there.”)171  Likewise, relationships 
with others are not solely instrumental nor do they wholly result from an abundance of 
spirit.  Rather, the relationships of the Übermensch are formed according to whatever 
best cultivates the “free spirit” in firstly oneself and secondly others. 
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F. Unhealthy Friendship 
 Perhaps Nietzsche’s conception of healthy friendship is most clear when he 
contrasts the former with the friendship of the lower-type.  Friendship rooted in 
antagonism and selfishness is reserved for the “higher men,”172 the “free spirit” of 
Human, All Too Human or the Übermensch of Zarathustra.  All other friendship – “herd” 
friendship – is a constitution of power struggles, rooted in acts of pity and misdirected 
moral compulsions.173  Clarifying his criticisms of friendship and his conception of 
unhealthy friendship – like Nietzsche’s moral polemics – draws important distinctions 
between pejorative acts that enslave a person and acts conducive to self-mastery and self-
cultivation.  Characteristic of all unhealthy friendship, however, is that it stifles the 
cultivation of “free spirits,” by limiting discussion, creativity and the potential for human 
greatness.  Aelred of Rieraulx, for example, describes a relationship nearly antithetical to 
Nietzsche’s conception of friendship and very similar to the “unhealthy” friendship he 
warns his audience of.  In De Spiritali Amicitia, Aelred of Rieraulx advocates a 
friendship that is rooted on the Christian ideals of unconditional and eternal love, and he 
advocates a relationship in which friends never use one another for selfish ends.174  In 
contrast Nietzsche’s friendship is ultimately selfish and the relationship is dependent 
upon how it cultivates one another.  Like Nietzsche’s unhealthy friendship, Aelred of 
Riervaulx’s friendship is elementally similar because of the emphasis placed on 
unconditional – and uncritical – support for one another, and these friends value someone 
more than himself or herself.  The friendship of Aelred of Riervaulx and his unhealthy 
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friendship are the archetype of Nietzsche’s concerns because of how this type of 
friendship limits and restricts a person’s ability to grow; however, Nietzsche recognizes 
that a friendship reaches this unhealthy state in a number of ways and for various reasons. 
 For example, Nietzsche warns that friendship originates in the insecurity of being 
alone, the same insecurity in which the “bad conscience” originates.175  “But during the 
longest period of the human past nothing was more terrible than to feel that one stood by 
oneself.  To be alone, to experience things in isolation, neither to obey nor to rule, to be 
an individual – that was not a pleasure but a punishment…”176  The companionship of 
another – the unhealthy friend – became the remedy for this all-too-human state.177  
These types of friends advance the herd mentality, not creativity or spirit.  Along with 
friendships that originate out of fear of being alone, Nietzsche is also critical of needy 
friends.  “Not to remain stuck to a person – not even the most loved – every person is a 
prison, also a nook…One must know how to conserve oneself: the hardest test of 
independence.”178  When a friend becomes dependent upon the other for happiness, then 
it is necessary for the free spirit to renounce the friendship.179  Passive friends and 
agreeable ones are also “undesirable”: “This one cannot say ‘No,’ and that one says to 
everything ‘Half and Half…’”180  Finally, friendship rooted in the virtues of selflessness 
and pity are “privately harmful” because they “deprive a human being of his noblest 
selfishness and the strength for the highest autonomy…”181  Nietzsche maintains that in 
order for persons to develop, it is necessary that they concede that they are firstly selfish 
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beings, and in realizing their motives, they are then capable of relating to their friends.  
This is not to say that Nietzsche advocated for a person to be narcissistic or obsessively 
self-interested – for Nietzsche, this is the egoistic mindset of herd instinct, rooted in fear.  
Rather, Nietzsche found that healthy friendships subsist when both parties concede that 
they are firstly self-interested.  Even Aristotle, who warns of undesirable extremes such 
as selflessness and selfishness, concedes that no one loves another more than himself.  
(Yet for Aristotle wellbeing of the self is bound up with the wellbeing of the other.)  
Nietzsche, like Aristotle, agrees that friendships are only efficacious (in either developing 
virtue or cultivating the Übermensch), when the friends are firstly invested in their own 
well-being.  
__________________________ 
 
This chapter began by setting Nietzsche’s friendship into the context of 
naturalism by first demonstrating that human beings are first animals and how they relate 
to others is a function of their nature.  In finding humans to be naturally combative and 
destructive at times, he also posits that the healthiest friends reflect a similar state of 
tension.  For Nietzsche, the healthiest – and thus, valuable friendship – is one that reflects 
the tension within nature, and so the friendship includes antagonism and criticism 
because of its value in cultivating one’s self.  Also characteristic of the healthy friendship 
is the self-interestedness of friends and the requisite phases of solitude and independence 
in the relationship.  
 What, then, is this friendship that Nietzsche posits, where friends are unreliable, 
selfish and absent?  The better question might be, rather, “is this really even friendship?”  
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Returning to haunt us is Nietzsche’s infamous assertion: “Friends, there are no friends!”  
While Nietzsche’s view is demonstrably unorthodox compared to other traditional 
conceptions of friends, his conception is rooted in an entirely different set of values and 
reflects his understanding that human nature is not fixed but moldable and filled with 
potential.  In this sense, Nietzsche’s treatment of friendship is similar to his treatment of 
morality and other social norms in the sense that he aims to deconstruct any presumed, 
common understanding.  While radically dissimilar to traditional understandings of 
friendship, Nietzsche is not introducing an all-together new idea; rather, he asks his 
audience to set aside any previous conceptions of friendship and reevaluate its worth 
according to an entirely new set of values.  In Nietzsche’s understanding, he reevaluates 
friendship to be fundamentally selfish, potentially antagonistic but also conducive to 
inspiring self-cultivation.   
 In the following chapter I will discuss how Nietzsche’s friendship is not only 
reinterpreting the worth of friendship but that he is implicitly arguing for a moral worth 
of friendship.  
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- Chapter Three - 
Friendship and Morality 
 
Friendship is not only an important aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophy of the 
human person, but it is also an aspect of his philosophy that implicitly deals with 
morality.  In the final chapter of this dissertation, I will investigate the relationship 
between Nietzsche’s understanding of friendship and his moral philosophy, and I will 
demonstrate how his treatment of friendship results in certain moral implications that 
clarify some aspects of his moral philosophy.  The chapter begins by first addressing how 
friendship and morality have been related in other philosophies, using the work of 
Michael Pakaluk, and then turning to how Nietzsche’s treatment of friendship relates to 
his conceptions of morality.  Recognizing similar criticisms and goals between these two 
aspects of his philosophy, it is suggested that, while not one in the same, there is an 
important relationship between these two ideas in Nietzsche’s thinking.  What is possible, 
however, is that Nietzsche’s critique of morality and his conception of friendship are 
distinct expressions of a single theory of value.  For both his conception of morality and 
his conception of friendship demonstrate that both are critical aspects in human 
development.  Thus, in this final chapter, I will describe how these two ideas relate within 
his philosophy, particularly in regard to how they effect the development of a person.  
Inarguably evident within Nietzsche’s works are his criticisms of morality.  For a 
variety of reasons, Nietzsche contends that conventional morality is unfounded, 
misdirected and unhealthy for human development, and as a result, some scholars have 
concluded that he is a nihilist and that concern for another person is not part of his 
philosophy.  His treatment of friendship, however, is notably more constructive, and thus 
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it provides an interesting avenue in which to analyze how Nietzsche understood 
relationships.  In contrast, a discussion on Nietzsche’s morality would consider how he 
thought a person should relate to everyone – not just her or his acquaintances.  In this 
sense, the conclusions of this discussion are limited to the nature of relationships within 
Nietzsche’s philosophy, thus avoiding the impossibly complicated discussion of how he 
may have held a positive construction of morality.  If Nietzsche is positing a friendship in 
which friends are concerned for one another, as the prior evidence suggests, then it is 
worthwhile to reexamine Nietzsche’s philosophy of morality in light of his conception of 
friendship.   
Common to both friendship and morality in general is the shared theme that a 
person is invested in the well-being of another person.  While not one in the same, the 
aims and nature of friendship and morality are similar enough to warrant further 
consideration of how these two ideas might be related.  Michael Pakaluk explains the 
moral nature of friendship in the introduction to his Other Selves: Philosophers and 
Friendship.  According to Pakaluk, a philosophy of friendship is one particular discussion 
in ethics.182  Pakaluk argues that any discussion of friendship is directly or indirectly 
rooted in moral theory, and any positive construction of friendship requires making the 
similar distinctions used to differentiate between deontological, teleological and virtue 
ethics.    For example, Aristotle’s primary discussion on friendship occurs within the 
Nicomachean Ethics, his paradigmatic treatise on his virtue ethics, because Aristotle 
found friendship to be a specific practice of the moral life.183  (Friends, Aristotle argues, 
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are intimately part of the good life because they are the other selves that inspire virtue 
and self-love in one another.)  In addition to a philosopher’s moral theory, Pakuluk notes 
that specific ideas like impartialism, universalism, consequentialism, altruism and egoism 
all become formative ethical themes that play a particularly important role in any 
conception of friendship. 184   Thus, understanding a philosopher’s treatment of friendship 
involves interpreting how themes within their moral philosophy are developed with their 
conception of friendship.  In Nietzsche’s case, relating morality and friendship might be 
argued to be more complicated than with other philosophers.  Nietzsche addresses the 
issues raised by Pakaluk like impartialism, universalism, consequentialism, altruism and 
egoism but complicates these ideas by using them to explain why, on his interpretation, 
morality fails to improve people.   
Moreover, as is the case with many other aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy, there 
is an obstacle in interpreting his writing; it is also the case in regard to Nietzsche’s 
constructive moral theory.  Nadeem Hussain, in his article “Honest Illusion: Valuing for 
Nietzsche’s Free Spirits” (2007), argues that there are uniquely difficult “interpretative 
constraints” when considering “how Nietzsche’s free spirits are supposed to engage in a 
practice of valuing.”185  Nietzsche’s criticisms of morality are prevalent throughout his 
works and thus a systematic interpretation has been much more plausible.  However, his 
valuation of morality – that is, the instances in which he instructs the “higher type” in 
how to create new values – occur less frequently and are often more dubious to interpret 
than other aspects of his philosophy.  The crux of this problem is that Nietzsche instructs 
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Übermenchen to create new values (morals), 186 but conversely argues that there are no 
moral facts – only moral judgments that lack moral objectivity.187  Thus, his audience is 
left with confounding problem of creating (moral) values that lack validity, and Nietzsche 
interpreters must delineate how an Übermenchen should value and what an Übermenchen 
should value.  The answers to these questions are a worthwhile topic for another 
discussion; for the remainder of this dissertation, however, I will argue that Nietzsche’s 
treatment of friendship compliments an investigation into his constructive moral claims 
and possibly provides a less ambiguous avenue for this discussion. 
Before addressing the moral themes in Nietzsche’s friendship, I will discuss how 
Nietzsche treats morality in general.  
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A. Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Morality 
There is evidence to argue that Nietzsche is strictly a nihilist, an immoral or 
amoral philosopher, and reading him otherwise is arguably problematic.  Nietzsche’s On 
the Genealogy of Morals, for instance, has charged Nietzschean scholars with the 
question of whether Nietzsche is a nihilist, and answers to this question remain varied 
and inconclusive.  Maudemarie Clark, for example, argues that Nietzsche’s immoralism 
is qualified in certain meanings within certain contexts.  For instance, Nietzsche is 
certainly an immoralist when he calls into question the value of all morality in his preface 
to On the Genealogy of Morals.  Clark agues that he is strictly an immoralist if we 
understand morality as a system of rules that governs how humans ought to act. 
Nietzsche, however, is not rejecting morality understood as just rules or prohibitions.188  
Brian Leiter, in contrast, distinguishes Nietzsche’s rejection of morality as a rejection of 
morality in the pejorative sense – that is, morality as it is detrimental to the cultivation of 
human creativity and spirit.189   
Pedro Tabensky, as another example, analyzes Nietzsche’s criticisms of morality 
as it relates to friendship in his Happiness: Personhood, Community, Purpose.  Tabensky 
uses Nietzsche to demonstrate the detrimental effects of individuals who assert a radical 
autonomy from their community: a condition that he describes as liberal individualism 
and thus, moral pluralism.190  In rejecting traditional values and morality, Tabensky 
argues, Nietzsche leaves his subject without any means to derive a purpose in life.  
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Tabensky’s analysis is similar to the criticisms raised by many Nietzsche interpreters who 
conclude that his rejection or morality is a consonant endorsement of nihilism.  Scholars 
like Clark and Leiter have shown that Nietzsche’s revaluation traditional values does not 
preclude morality – or necessitate nihilism.  Instead, in revaluating traditional morality, 
Nietzsche is calling his audience to not simply inherit their values, but rather, people give 
meaning to their values when they recreate them on their own accord.  Ironically, 
Tabensky concludes that Nietzsche “invites us to construct an Apollonian fantasy in order 
conceal the meaningless of it all”, when Nietzsche is aiming for the exact opposite.191  
Rather, Nietzsche calls his audience to deconstruct the moral ideals that they have 
assumed to be true – ideals he finds meaningless and pejorative – and offers a truly 
meaningful edict: one cannot inherit values from another philosopher or religion, for 
example, but an individual must create their own values if they are to have meaning.  
(Tabensky correctly notes that Nietzsche offers a daunting starting point, in which a 
person cannot assume anything to be true, and particularly God.) 
The question of how Nietzsche is an immoralist requires further inquiry beyond 
the scope of this paper but there is more than sufficient scholarship on the matter to 
suggest that Nietzsche is not strictly a nihilist.  The aim here is to develop the moral 
implications of Nietzsche’s friendship; the aim is not to reconstruct Nietzsche’s 
friendship in terms of morality.  There is no explicit evidence in his works that indicates 
he had intended for his conception of friendship to be the foundation of his “higher 
morality,” and so my aim is not treat Nietzsche’s friendship as an understanding of 
morality unto itself.192  Rather, as Pakaluk suggests, there is a strong relation between a 
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philosopher’s conception of morality and friendship.  In the most basic sense, morality 
and friendship are ideas that deal with the well-being of self and persons’ relationships to 
others and society.  It is far from the case that morality and friendship are one in the 
same, or that friendship is a subcategory of morality.  Nonetheless, both friendship and 
morality share similar themes, and so it is necessary to consider how these ideas are 
related.  In Nietzsche’s case, his conception of friendship is affected by his criticisms of 
morality and evaluation of the Übermenschen.  Before identifying the moral implications 
of Nietzsche’s friendship, I will consider how his critique of morality influences his 
conception of friendship.  To further explain Nietzsche’s critique of morality, I will 
employ the research of Brian Leiter in his work Nietzsche on Morality.193 
Nietzsche’s treatment of morality within On the Genealogy of Morals is the focus 
of Leiter’s Nietzsche.  Within this text Leiter posits the claim that Nietzsche continues his 
“revaluation of values” and calls into question prior attempts to achieve human 
excellence through moral principles.  Leiter argues that Nietzsche’s central claim is that 
prior moralities are misguided and ineffective, and ultimately compromise the natural 
excellence of the human species.  Nietzsche is not concerned with all morality in general, 
Leiter argues, nor is he concerned with only Christian, Kantian, Utilitarian or European 
morality.  Nietzsche, rather, is concerned with “morality in the pejorative sense (MPS);” 
that is, Nietzsche examines the detrimental effects that morality has on the self, others 
and society on the whole.194  Leiter surmises that Nietzsche brings four basic charges 
against morality understood in this way.  First, Nietzsche rejects MPS because it 
encourages mediocrity and devalues excellence.  Second, Leiter argues that Nietzsche 
                                                 
193
 Leiter, Brian. Nietzsche on Morality. Routledge Publishing, New York: 2001. 
194
 Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality, 74.  
- 80-  
rejects MPS because it originates in a hatred of the most privileged people in society.  
Nietzsche charges that moralities are created by those who are “weak,” “slaves,” or 
“mediocre” because they resent the influence and lifestyle of the upper-class.  Leiter next 
argues that Nietzsche rejects MPS because it claims to be universally applicable.  Finally, 
Nietzsche also rejects morality because it relies on certain metaphysical and empirical 
presuppositions that are philosophically untenable.195   
The core of Nietzsche’s critique is his claim that normative morality is 
detrimental to the flourishing of “higher men” (or the “Übermensch” in his Zarathustra.)  
Aiming to determine what might promote flourishing among the “higher type,” Leiter 
describes the basic characteristics of this category of person. The “higher men” hold a 
combination of five sufficient characteristics: the “higher type” is (1) solitary and uses 
others instrumentally, (2) driven towards the completion of a unifying project, (3) healthy 
and resilient, (4) self-reverent, and (5) one who affirms the “eternal recurrence.”196  MPS, 
in contrast, restricts the cultivation of these characteristics.  The implication is that 
Nietzsche endorses a “revaluation of values,” and believes that the central aim of 
morality should be to protect and promote the flourishing of the “higher type.”  
For Leiter, Nietzsche’s critique of morality reflects his belief in naturalism and 
that all things unnatural are harmful to the cultivation of humans.  In the next section, I 
will show that Nietzsche’s criticisms of morality are similar to his evaluations of 
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friendship in that both demonstrate Nietzsche’s belief that human nature is refined and 
develops through a natural process, driven by pain and criticism.  
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B. Comparing Nietzsche’s Treatment of Friendship and Morality 
Valuing nature and what he sees as natural conflict and dialogue, Nietzsche 
criticizes unhealthy friendship for reasons similar to how he criticizes pejorative morality.  
For example, Nietzsche describes, and warns his audience of, parasitic friendships in 
which friends avoid causing any strife in the relationship by only affirming and never 
disagreeing with the other.197  It is these types of friendships that Nietzsche describes 
with contempt and the types of friendships that are most susceptible to the same 
criticisms as Nietzsche’s evaluation of pejorative morality.  This “unhealthy friendship,” 
as it relates to pejorative morality, encourages mediocrity and pity, and originates out of 
the needs of the “weak,” avoids confrontation, and creates debts between friends.198  In 
this sense, Nietzsche’s criticisms of pejorative morality are applicable and parallel to his 
descriptions of “unhealthy friendship,” and so it is worth investigating further the 
relationship between Nietzsche’s treatment of morality and friendship.  Here again it is 
important to reiterate that the aim of this paper is not to develop Nietzsche’s “new ethic” 
nor is it to argue that Nietzsche’s friendship is a form of morality.  By comparing 
Nietzsche’s criticisms and praises of friendship and morality, however, I aim to 
demonstrate how there are moral implications to his friendship.  
 In the Genealogy, Nietzsche draws a connection between personal relationships 
and morality when he evaluates the feelings of guilt and obligation in relationships:  
To return to our investigation: the feeling of guilt, of personal obligation, 
had its origin, as we saw, in the oldest and most primitive personal 
relationship, that between buyer and seller, creditor and debtor: it was here 
that one person first encountered another person, that one person first 
measured himself against another.  No grade of civilization however low, 
has yet been discovered in which something this relationship has not been 
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noticeable.  Setting prices, determining values, contriving equivalence, 
exchanging – these preoccupied the earliest thinking of man to so great an 
extent that in a certain sense they constitute thinking as such: here it was 
that the oldest kind of astuteness developed; here likewise, we may 
suppose, did human pride, the feeling of superiority in relationship to 
other animals, have its first beginnings.  Perhaps our word “man” (manas) 
still expresses something of precisely this feeling of self-satisfaction: man 
designated himself as the creature that measures values, evaluates and 
measures, as the “valuating animal as such.199 
 
In this passage Nietzsche’s concern is that moralities reflect humanity’s preoccupation 
with evaluating, measuring and comparing persons to each other.  Beginning with the 
most basic feelings of guilt and obligation, Nietzsche argues that persons presume that it 
is natural to compare and evaluate the “worth” of others.  Empowered to pass judgment 
on others, persons construct normative standards and thereby create moralities.  This 
presumed judgmental nature is rooted in the most basic and personal relationships, in 
which persons develop a sense of guilt, obligation and indebtedness – all characteristics 
which Nietzsche uses to describe unhealthy friendship.200  
 As an unhealthy friendship invites criticisms similar to pejorative morality, 
Nietzsche also prescribes friendship and morality with similar goals.  On this account, 
Nietzsche is not a nihilist, as he suggests that a new ethic is possible if the aim is to 
cultivate the characteristics of the “higher type.”  Nietzsche suggests that this new ethic 
would hold radically different goals and methods than pejorative moralities, and instead, 
conflict would be welcomed if encourage growth in one another. Nietzsche hypothesizes 
on the basic themes of this new morality in the Genealogy: 
The attainment of this goal would require a different kind of spirit from 
that likely to appear in this present age: spirits strengthened by war and 
victory, for whom conquest, adventure, danger, and even pain have 
become needs; it would require habituation to the keen air of the heights, 
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to winter journeys, to ice and mountains in every sense; it would require 
even a kind of sublime wickedness, an ultimate, supremely self-confident 
mischievousness in knowledge that goes with great health; it would 
require, in brief and alas, precisely this great health! 
… this man of the future, who will redeem us not only from the hitherto 
reigning ideal but also from that which was bound to grow out of it, the 
great nausea, the will to nothingness, nihilism; this bell-stroke of noon and 
of the great decision that liberates the will again and restores its goal to the 
earth and his hope to man; this Antichrist and antinihilist; this victor over 
God and nothingness – he must come one day. – 201 
 
As with the similarities between his criticisms of morality and friendship, his prescription 
for new morality parallels his praises of healthy friendship.  As suggested earlier, 
Nietzsche gives friendship his highest valuation when it challenges complacency and 
encourages both the friend and befriended to more earnestly evaluate their self.  This 
healthy friendship exists only in a contemptuous state of warring and challenging one 
another.   
 Nietzsche also encourages a similar attitude toward social norms and friendship, 
advocating for persons to be critical of their assumed roles and to avoid complacency.  In 
his “revaluation of values,” Nietzsche addresses a number of issues that he claims plague 
society, including German politics and nationalism, Wagner and the artistic movement he 
represents, religion and religious people.202  His criticisms, however, are not an attempt to 
hold society to any normative standards.  Rather, Nietzsche is proposing an attitude and 
certain mindset that encourages his readers to be reactive to, and critical of, the social 
elements that preserve pejorative morality.  It is within the context of this attitude that 
Nietzsche finds hope for “the herd” and it is also the attitude that Nietzsche prescribes for 
the most capable people: the “higher type,” the Übermensch.  Most pertinent to this 
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discussion is the parallel between the moral attitude that Nietzsche encourages in his 
revaluation of values and the attitude that he praises in the healthy friendships.   
 Nietzsche argues that a healthy friendship includes painful disagreement, if 
friends come to a clearer perspective as a result of the conflict.  Whilst this understanding 
of friendship might seem problematic, I will use Axel Honneth’s research to explain how 
this type of relationship is possible within Nietzsche’s philosophy. 
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C. Axel Honneth’s Theory of Recognition and Intersubjectivity  
As described earlier, the friendship that Nietzsche finds to be most valuable is a 
friendship in which both the friend and the befriended are invested in their own health.  
On Nietzsche’s interpretation healthy friends approach their relationship willing to 
sacrifice emotional security and the conventional comforts of the friendship if self-
betterment is at stake.  In his book The Struggle for Recognition (1949), Axel Honneth 
expresses a similar understanding of friendship in which persons mature and develop a 
greater sense of the self through their interactions with others.  While Honneth is 
primarily concerned with the philosophy of Hegel and George Herbert Mead in his 
Struggle for Recognition, his treatment of relationships is noteworthy because of the 
similarities between his understanding of relationships and Nietzsche’s conception of 
friendship.  Like Nietzsche, Honneth is also concerned with development of a person, and 
his theory on self-recognition is particularly helpful in explaining how Nietzsche’s 
conception of friendship could be actualized.   In considering Honneth’s theory of 
recognition, I aim to further explain the type of healthy friendship that Nietzsche 
advocated.  
For Honneth, a person is naturally in need of respect, confidence and esteem, and 
these needs are satisfied by virtue of our relationships with others.  In examining and 
comparing the philosophies of Mead and Hegel, Honneth investigates how relationships 
and social struggle affect the development of a person.  He notes that “…both thinkers 
interpreted social struggle … in such a way that social struggle could become a 
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structuring force in the moral development of society.”203  Like Nietzsche, Honneth 
evaluates social struggle as being integral to personal development.  Honneth concludes 
that the highest attainment of self can only be gained through relationships: 
 
The possibility for sensing, interpreting, and realizing one’s needs and 
desires as a fully autonomous and individuated person – in short, the 
possibility of identity-formation – depends crucially on the development 
of self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem.  These three modes of 
relating practically to oneself can only be acquired and maintained 
intersubjectively, through being granted recognition by others whom one 
also recognizes.204 
 
Honneth develops his thesis in terms of the relationship between a mother and he 
employs the psychoanalytical research of Donald W. Winnicott.  In this type of 
relationship discussed by Winnicott, both the mother and infant are dependent upon each 
other but also struggle for autonomy.  Realizing that their own autonomy is dependent 
upon the recognition of the other, both the mother and infant test their independence.  
Here Honneth describes a relationship similar to Nietzsche’s friendship in which friends 
both resist and embrace the criticism and perspective of the other.  Common to both 
Honneth and Nietzsche is the idea that relationships have central value in self-
development and that the self-development is characterized by an organic struggle of 
dependency and resistance.  
 Honneth concludes that all relationships rooted in love reflect the early mother-
child model because this is a person’s only understanding of how one should care for 
another.  Furthermore, Honneth interprets Hegel and Mead as believing that the threads 
of society – the politics, familial relations, and people who relate over shared values – 
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can be traced back to the model of relationship shared between mother and child.205  For 
Honneth, these relationships are also moral in the sense that there is normative judgment 
about the legitimacy of social arrangements and that these relationships are necessary for 
the development of a social consciousness that is capable of making ethical judgments.  
… because this relationship of recognition prepares the ground for a type 
of relation-to-self in which subjects mutually acquire basic confidence in 
themselves, it is both conceptually and genetically prior to every other 
form of reciprocal recognition.  This fundamental level of emotional 
confidence – not only in the experience of needs and feelings , but also in 
their expression – which the intersubjective experience of lover helps to 
bring about, constitutes the psychological precondition for the 
development of all further attitudes of self-respect.206 
 
Here Honneth suggests that intersubjectivity is not necessarily morally substantial in 
itself but that it is integral to the development of the social consciousness (which is 
morally substantive.)  Likewise, Nietzsche values friendship for similar reasons in that he 
concludes friends to be central to self-cultivation.  In this sense there is also a normative 
component to Nietzsche’s philosophy in that he distinguishes between friendships that 
are conducive to cultivation (healthy friendship) and friendships that parasitic and 
detrimental to self-development.  
Honneth’s theory of self-recognition also describes how a relationship can be 
fundamentally selfish but equally beneficial to both parties.  On Nietzsche’s account of 
friendship, one befriends another because there is benefit for himself or herself by 
treating the other as a friend.  In this sense, Nietzsche’s friendship might be argued to be 
fundamentally selfish.  An examination of a selfish friendship, however, begs the 
question if whether what is being described is truly friendship: that is, is one truly a 
friend if his concern for the other is rooted in his own self-betterment.  For Nietzsche, 
                                                 
205
 Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, 95.  
206
 Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, 107. 
- 89-  
persons can be concerned for one another but ultimately concern is for oneself because 
both gain a greater understanding of her or himself as a result of the friendship.  On 
Nietzsche’s account friends can only be self-interested, and if a person is not interested in 
bettering themselves, then there is nothing for the friend to gain.  A person who wants 
security and companionship might be fully interested in protecting themselves but they 
do not have any aims of bettering themselves – these are the not the type of self-
interested friends of Nietzsche’s concern.  Rather, he advocates a friendship in which 
each person is fully invested in bettering itself, aiming to develop the qualities of the 
Übermensch.  It is these persons who strive for excellence that indirectly effect and 
cultivate their friends.  For Nietzsche, then, a friend must remain fully self-interested, and 
if he is not interested in bettering himself, then he cannot be a friend.207 
                                                 
207
 D V §516, 207.  
- 90-  
D. The Unique Role of Friends 
Honneth’s theory of self-recognition raises another critical moral implication for 
Nietzsche’s account of friendship.  Honneth, in his analysis of self-recognition, places 
considerable emphasis on the relationships, and in particular, Honneth argues that it is 
through others –the “intersubjective relationship” – that persons come to understand 
themselves.  Nietzsche, likewise, claims that friendship entails a contrasting interplay in 
which friends hold each other accountable and honest to themselves and nature. (It is this 
healthy friendship that is conducive to producing the Übermenchen.)  While a person 
may interact with many “others,” a friend, in particular, plays a unique and critical role in 
self-development. 
 Persons share relationships with a variety of others throughout their lives, 
including such complex relationships as parent-child relationships, romantic 
relationships, and more simple relationships, such as one’s relationship to her regular 
barber and childhood companions.  How a person relates to the other, however, is 
markedly different in each of these kinds of relationships.  As persons relate differently in 
each of these types of relationships, Nietzsche explains that each has a variety of effects 
on a person’s development.  Nietzsche does not give a formal classification for different 
types of friends, but he suggests that there are certain friends who are acquaintances, 
those who are enjoyable at times, those who express concern for each other, and those 
who are often only tolerated and who are kept at a certain distance.208  In such 
relationships, a friend only has a partial understanding of the other, limited by what 
thoughts and feelings are shared between each other.  In this “friendship,” each friend 
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manufactures how he or she understands each other.209  These types of friends are more 
interested in maintaining the security of the relationship, and they are not interested in 
“warring” or engaging in the kind of conflict that Nietzsche attributes to the healthy 
relationships shared by Übermenschen.210  There is no urgency to confront any faults of 
the other or the inadequacies of the relationship in this type of friendship, and so it is 
natural that a person begins to ignore and dismiss these friends as they become 
inconvenient, burdensome or intolerable.  Most importantly, the type of friendship that 
Nietzsche is referring to here is not of the type that is particularly conducive in 
developing a person.   
 Rather, the healthy friendships in which friends are willing to “go to war”211 with 
one another are markedly different from the unhealthy friendships that Nietzsche 
describes.  A healthy friendship aims to cultivate the characteristics of the Übermensch 
within each other, and so these types of friends relate to each other in a way 
incomparable to all other friendships.  The type of friendship that Nietzsche values is one 
in which friends know much about each other; the greatest friend will understand the 
befriended better than any other person (possibly including even their own self.)  The 
persons with the greatest potential to become healthy friends are given privileged insight 
into the characteristics that define one another, and in this sense, they are the people who 
are most able to evaluate and interpret their friend’s actions and intentions.  While many 
others evaluate and interpret the actions of their acquaintances, only one’s closest friends 
reserve a unique understanding of the befriended – an understanding that is unmatched by 
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any other outside perspective.212  Honneth describes this kind of friendship as being a 
unique relationship in which subjects experience themselves through the other and enter 
into the “shared experience of an unselfconscious conversation or an utterly unforced 
moment together.”213  It is this honesty within friendship that Nietzsche finds to be 
uniquely instrumental in the development of a person.   
The role of a friend as an aid in divulging the true nature of oneself is related to a 
more encompassing moral theme within Nietzsche’s philosophy of the human person.  As 
discussed earlier, the human person is a complex culmination of evolution, comprised of 
a variety of instinctual drives.  At first a person’s nature might be incomprehensible but 
eventually the evolved person – one who aspires to become Übermensch-like – comes to 
understand his nature and why he feels certain desires and compulsions.  A person who 
assumes these instinctual drives to be unknowable lives in confusion and frustration 
because he cannot understand himself; this person is captive to his own nature.  The 
instance when a person realizes that she can now choose to follow or to ignore her 
instincts, then a person becomes something more than animal and she develops an 
“illness.”214  Here a person overcomes part of their animality and, in terms of Honneth’s 
theory, they further develop their own individuality.  Animals remain content in their 
own nature, however, ‘the diseased humanity’ continues to live in a “mere bundle of 
unfulfilled possibilities of ‘indeterminate nature,’ ‘abounds in contradictory evaluations 
and, consequently, in contradictory desires.’”215  This is the plot in which a person finds 
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herself: ‘more than’ animal but in the process of becoming, caught between the tension of 
declining back toward animality and subliming on towards ‘more than’ person.   
 To become “more than man,” a person must “overcome” herself”: she must 
become an Übermensch.216  Aiming to define who is an Übermensch, Nietzsche asks, 
“what is the ape to man?  A laughing-stock or a painful embarrassment.  And man shall 
be just that for the Übermensch.”217  Unlike animals which lack self-awareness and 
reason of humans, the human person developed ideas like God, heaven and hell, 
principles of justice, so as to remedy their insecurity of realizing their finite, all-too-
human plot.  The construction of these self-effacing ideas – Nietzsche’s “bad 
conscience”218 – fundamentally results in a person losing her sense of self.  Rather than 
trying to apprehend their basic animalistic drives – that is, their true self – persons instead 
create realities and fabricate faculties, thus fashioning a more meaningful existence.  
Having lost a sense of self, it is the task of those who are capable to overcome the 
temptation of creating a false identity by coming to terms with their true nature.219  
Kaufmann surmises Nietszsche’s idea of the how a person overcomes himself and 
becomes Übermensch-like: “the unphilosophic and inartistic mass remain animalistic, 
while the man who overcomes himself, sublimating his impulses, consecrating his 
passions, and giving style to his character, becomes truly human – ie. the 
Übermensch.”220  Nietzsche’s Übermensch is not an ideal being for which one should 
aim; an ideal person is antithetical to Nietzsche’s philosophy because it holds persons 
accountable to a fixed moral standard.  Rather, Nietzsche describes (and applauds) the 
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Übermensch as being one who is critical of her or his social context, remaining wholly 
immersed in social surroundings but continually striving to understand their nature, (even 
when social norms tempt him or her to become uncritical and dormant.)  
 In Leiter’s Nietzsche, he argues that, for Nietzsche, the incomprehensibility of 
human drives leads to a critical flaw in how a person understands themselves and 
morality.221  Because a person’s motives are not fully transparent, it is impossible to 
assess the moral worth of this person’s actions.  Yet, while Nietzsche finds the 
incomprehensibility of self to be problematic for morality, he also suggests that there is a 
normative value in coming to understand oneself.  Understanding one’s drives is 
characteristic of the Übermensch and it is how one overcomes oneself and “gives to style 
to his character.”222  For Nietzsche, this self-understanding is critical for a meaningful 
life:  
No, life has not disappointed me.  On the contrary, I find it truer, more 
desirable and mysterious every year – ever since the day when the great 
liberator came to me: the idea that life could be an experiment of the 
seeker for knowledge – and not duty, not a calamity, not trickery. – and 
knowledge itself: let it be something else for others; for exampl , a bed to 
rest on, or the way to such a bed, or a diversion, or a form of leisure – for 
me it is a world of dangers and victories in which heroic feeling, too, find 
places to dance and play.  ‘Life as a means to knowledge’ – with this 
principle in one’s heart one can life not only boldly but ever gaily, and 
laugh gaily, too.  And who knows how to laugh anyway and live well if he 
does not first know a good deal about war and victory?223 
 
The “heroic” stand to gain much by coming to terms with their nature and learning to 
understand their drives.  Nietzsche demonstrates the value in understanding oneself by 
installing this as a recurring theme in his philosophy.224   
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Relationships, and particularly friendship, play a critical role in how persons 
come to understand their own drives.  For example, Nietzsche argues that a person is able 
to conceal many of his motives to himself but the friend is uniquely efficacious because 
he holds a distinctively intimate perspective of the other.  
Self-observation.— Man is very well defended against himself, against his 
own spying and sieges; usually he is able to make out no more of himself 
than his outer fortifications. The actual stronghold is inaccessible to him, 
even invisible, unless friends and enemies turn traitor and lead him there 
by a secret path.225 
 
It is only the persons with the unique understanding of the befriended that are truly their 
friend.  Nietzsche places special emphasis on the distinction between the intimacy of 
healthy and unhealthy friendships, suggesting that friendships have the potential to 
cultivate another only when a certain level of intimacy is established between friends.226  
A true and healthy friend, holding the unique understanding of the befriended, is solely 
able to challenge and possibly cause cultivation in the befriended.  It is because of the 
unique role of a friend that Nietzsche places particular emphasis on friendship as being an 
integral part in the cultivation of the “higher type.”  For Nietzsche, friends are the distinct 
other that know enough about one another so as to be uniquely efficacious in their 
criticisms and evaluations of the other.227  Nietzsche’s healthy friendships are a 
particularly important part of his moral philosophy because of their ability to effect how a 
person develops.  All other relationships – while valuable to some degree – lack the 
efficacy needed to change those invested into the relationship.  Healthy friends, however, 
invest enough of themselves in one another such that it is possible (and likely) for these 
friends to effect one another through evaluation and criticism. 
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 For Nietzsche, the moral relationship shared between healthy friends depends 
upon honest and intimate knowledge of another and, with this unique knowledge, friends 
will hold each other accountable for their self-destructive behavior.  Here it is worthwhile 
to ask what a friend would need to know about the other in order for them to make 
criticisms that are helpful and valuable to self-cultivation.  Nietzsche reasons that one is 
unable to be fully self-accountable because his self-knowledge is limited to one’s own 
perspective.  In a sense, he is too close to himself and so he is unable to have the 
perspective need to recognize certain dispositions as self-destructive.  The friend, rather, 
is the person outside of the self who knows the other more intimately because of their 
outside perspective.  What Nietzsche does not discuss, however, is the type and extent of 
the understanding that a friend must have of another before he is able to be critical of his 
friend’s shortcomings.  Moreover, a friend brings biases to the relationship that skews his 
perspective and thus his ability to be critical of his friend.228  The most important of these 
biases is that a friend is firstly self-interested (according to Nietzsche) and so any 
criticisms offered are likely to benefit the friend who criticizes rather than the friend who 
receives the criticisms.  A friend then must receive the criticism knowing that they are 
biased by his friend’s own self-interest.  This does not, however, wholly negate the value 
of the criticism because it is still possible that a person may use a friend’s perspective as 
a starting point for self-examination.  For example, a person may be frustrated because 
his friend is spending less time with him, causing him to become critical of his friend’s 
laziness.  In this case, the person offers the criticism from a biased and self-interested 
standpoint, yet it is still valuable for the friend who receives the criticism if she 
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reexamines how she spends her time.  In this sense, one must not discount the value of 
criticisms issued by seemingly unhealthy friends.  In order for healthy friendships to have 
moral value, however, there must be criteria for what type of understanding friends must 
have of each other.  For instance, healthy friends must understand each other in such a 
way that they are able to assess, evaluate and criticize one another, while conveying their 
thoughts in such a way that their friends will be responsive to their criticisms.  
 The type of understanding needed for a healthy friendship develops out of trust, in 
gaining a repertoire of experiences and history, in engaging in laughter and sadness, and 
in ultimately being comfortable with sharing aspects of him or herself, reserved only for 
their truest friends.  Friends, however, do not disclose the most intimate aspect of 
themselves because they appreciate the Übermenschen qualities in the other.  Rather, 
friends disclose the most honest and intimate aspects of themselves after the relationship 
has matured and the friends have developed a comfortable trust with one another.  
The beginnings of relationships are often demarcated by common, shared 
experiences; for example, settings conducive to instigating relationships are the 
workplace, the school playground, bars and restaurants.  Characteristic of these 
adolescent relationships are friends laughing together, commiserating over their dislikes, 
and bonding over a common goal, for example.  In terms of Nietzsche’s philosophy, 
these relationships contain elements of unhealthy friendships in which friends conform to 
be like one another and avoid confrontation in order to main stability within the 
relationship.  This is the mentality and approach to friendships that children experience in 
grade school in which the aim is simply to “fit in.”229  Friendships do not just begin with 
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this type of interaction (that is, the interaction similar to Nietzsche’s “unhealthy friends”) 
but friendships are also maintained by this type of interaction.  Here is a critical fault in 
Nietzsche’s treatment of friendship.  Friends cannot only war with one another; rather, 
friends must relate to each other like Nietzsche’s “unhealthy friends” and act in such a 
way that is antithetical to the healthy friendship that Nietzsche advocates.  In this sense, 
Nietzsche’s understanding of a healthy friendship seems to entail characteristics of his 
understanding of an unhealthy friendship.   
 If Nietzsche’s conception of friendship is to be possible, one must maintain a 
friendship while willing to be antagonistic and judgmental towards their friends.  So it is 
appropriate to ask Nietzsche’s audience if it is possible to maintain the type of friendship 
that he advocates.  Calling to mind past experiences and their feelings toward their 
current friendship, Nietzsche’s audience must identify how they have been affected by 
their friends.  Inconsistencies in Nietzsche’s conception of friendship become apparent if 
one decides that Nietzsche’s conception of the critical, healthy friendship is dissimilar to 
their experiences with their closest friends.  Nietzsche suggests that when a critical (but 
healthy) friendship becomes difficult to maintain, then it is necessary to establish a 
certain emotional distance, such that the friend remains tolerable but uniquely insightful.  
If friends are unable to be both critical and emotionally distant, then Nietzsche has 
incorrectly understood how healthy friends will relate.  For friends who are emotionally 
distant are unlikely to be effective in challenging one another because they are unable to 
establish the trust needed to sustain the relationship.  Rather, it is necessary to develop a 
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certain amount of “unhealthy” support in order for their judgments to be effective.  While 
Nietzsche argued for a healthy friendship in which friends aim to better themselves and 
one another through hardness and conflict, it is an unlikely relationship because it 
requires friends to be mainly critical and emotionally distant.   
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E. The Moral Implications of Nietzsche’s Friendships 
Nietzsche’s friendship – whilst possibly indicative of his understanding of a 
constructive morality – cannot be understood as a “new Nietzchean ethic” – Nietzsche’s 
friendship is clearly rooted in the self-betterment of both the friend and the befriended, 
and in this sense, his friendship contains parallels to what might be considered moral 
action.  The scope of his friendship, however, is also limited to specific and individual 
relationships, and so it is problematic to conclude that Nietzsche’s treatment of friendship 
contains the basis of a new ethic.  (An ethic, in contrast to a friendship, explains a 
person’s relationship to other people in general whereas a philosophy of friendship 
explains the moral, or amoral, relationship between two people.)  Even though 
Nietzsche’s friendship contains moral implications, his philosophy of friendship is not a 
parallel for a broader ethic.  A friend is invested in the betterment of the other but the 
friend does not owe his friends anything.  Moreover, falling within the scope of a 
morality or an ethic are issues dealing with just and proper action in politics, culture and 
social trends – all of which are ideas beyond the scope of the moral implications of 
Nietzsche’s friendship.  The healthy friendship that Nietzsche values does not imply a 
moral system or an ethic; rather, Nietzsche values an ethical approach – an ethical more 
– to how we might better understand friendships.  
In valuing friendship and how friends approach friendship over the friend in-
itself, Nietzsche marks a critical distinction in the moral implications of his friendship.  
For Nietzsche, the health of the friendship is more valuable than the person who one 
befriends in terms of self-cultivation.  In this healthy friendship, then, a person must 
maintain a friendship in which there exists earnest communication and in which he aims 
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to better one’s self.  Correspondingly, a friend must not attach himself to the other in such 
a way that the health of the friendship would be compromised.  In this sense, Nietzsche 
signifies an important, underlying element of his friendship in that the relationship – 
being intangible and a non-being – is valued over the friend, an actual human being, and 
the friendship is only valuable insofar that the two individuals who comprise the 
relationship are bettered by each other’s company.  
 While Nietzsche’s evaluation of healthy friendship is evidently not intended as a 
morality unto itself, there are elements of his friendship that are implicitly moral in 
content; namely, a primary concern of friendship is deciding whether the relationship is 
detrimental to or helpful to the development of the person.  With the aim to develop 
“higher type,” Nietzsche describes a friendship in which persons remain ultimately 
selfish but they reach out to one another because there is a common potential for self-
betterment.  The process of befriending – understanding, evaluating and challenging one 
another – is ultimately valued over the friend in itself, and so it is worth losing a friend in 
order to maintain the integrity of a healthy friendship.  Rather than specific types of 
actions, Nietzsche advocates a more in which friends adhere to being critical of one 
another and sacrifice the friendship as it becomes parasitic.  Here again Nietzsche 
demonstrates how his conception of friendship is unorthodox by arguing that, in terms of 
human development, a person’s ability be critical of a friend is more valuable than this 
person’s resolute care for a friend.  Friendship that requires that persons care for their 
friends as the foremost priority, in Nietzsche’s philosophy, is not friendship.  Instead, he 
argues that friends offer much more to each other when they recognize self-
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interestedness, when they desire to grow in self-understanding, and when they are willing 
to invite this growth at the cost conflict.    
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Conclusion 
The friendship that Nietzsche values most is distinctly unorthodox in contrast to 
prior treatments of friendship that include ideas like unlimited selflessness and 
unconditional support.  Nietzsche agrees that, while these types of relationships exist, this 
friendship is more worthy of criticism than praise.  The persons in these friendships, 
Nietzsche charges, are complacent and dishonest with themselves, and they promote 
weakness rather than strength and character.  In contrast, Nietzsche praises friends who 
divulge their weaknesses and faults to the other and friends who are willing to disagree 
and “war” with each other.  This healthy form of friendship, he claims, is rooted in the 
aim to promote strength in character and this accomplished when persons strive to reach 
the most earnest understanding of him or herself – an understanding that includes the 
awareness of one’s greatest faults, tendencies and shortcomings.  Nietzsche demonstrates 
the value of healthy friendship throughout his works, however, he suggests that his 
healthy friendship is uncommon and reserved for individuals with unique potential (ie. 
the potential of developing in the Übermenschen.)  In actuality, Nietzsche recognizes, 
friendships often contain characteristics of both his healthy and unhealthy friendships.  
Moreover, clearly his aim is not construct an ideal of friendship with which 
Übermenschen evaluate their success, not he is creating a dichotomy of good and bad 
friendship.  (Both these aims are antithetical to Nietzsche’s greater effort to deconstruct 
the dichotomous relationship of what is good and bad, and his attempt to revaluate 
ideals.)   
Nietzsche anticipates that this type of friendship is so foreign to most people that 
he questions if whether this is truly friendship.  In an allusion to Aristotle, Nietzsche 
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analyzes the assertion, “friends, there are no friends.”230  Here he addresses the meaning 
of true friendship.   
Of friends. – Only reflect to yourself how various are the feelings, how 
divided the opinions, even among your closet acquaintances, how even the 
same opinions are of a quite different rank or intensity in the heads of your 
friends than they are in yours; how manifold are the occasions for 
misunderstanding, for hostility and rupture… 
 
… Through knowing ourselves, and regarding our own nature as a moving 
sphere of moods and opinions, and thus learning to despise ourself a little, 
we restore our proper equilibrium with others.  It is true we have good 
reason to think little of each of our acquaintances, even the greatest of 
them; but equally good reason to direct this feeling back on to ourself. – 
And so, since we can endure ourself, let us also endure other people; and 
perhaps to each of us there will come the more joyful hour when we 
exclaim: 
‘Friends, there are no friends!’ thus said the dying sage;  
‘Foes, there are no foes!’ say I, the living fool.231 
 
For Nietzsche, “there are no friends” if the friend conceals his opinions in order to 
maintain an amicable relationship.   
The aim of true friendship is not to maintain congeniality; true friends aim to be 
honestly critical of themselves, the other and their relationship.  Not all people or all 
relationships are capable of true friendship; however, Nietzsche values friendships that 
risk antagonizing one another in order to cultivate self-understanding, strength of 
character and a more authentic relationship.  Nietzsche finds value in traditional attributes 
of friendship like compassion and care; it is imperative, however, that these attributes do 
not restrict friends from offering their earnest evaluations of one another.  (Nietzsche 
warns, however, that friends are often tempted to value compassion and care more than 
the potential for growth, and thus devaluing the friendship.)  Nietzsche recognizes that 
the friendship he celebrates is drastically different from a common understanding of 
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friendship, and so it is possible that the relationship he describes is not even “friendship” 
– he is describing something beyond friendship.232  Nietzsche suggests that it is necessary 
to deconstruct the common understanding of friendship and then re-evaluate friendship in 
terms of how friends cultivate strength and understanding within each other.  For 
Nietzsche, it is worth risking “unhappiness” if it is possible that one will gain a more 
honest and thorough understanding of one’s self.  Nietzsche’s friendship, while 
characterized by friends who share honest criticism and who are willing to war for sake 
of self-betterment, it is also a relationship in which a person stands to gain much for her 
or himself.  In Nietzsche’s terms, healthy friends work to refine him or her own self – and 
one another indirectly – in such a way they become similar to the Übermensch, who 
Nietzsche valued as the being with most character and strength. 
 As the aim of human development and friendship, the Übermensch is the person 
who is “faithful to the earth,” recognizing his or her basic animal nature and embracing 
what it means to be an ultimately natural, animal-like being.233  Thus, the Übermensch, 
and those who befriend those who aspire to be like the Übermensch, are wary of 
“otherworldly hopes,” philosophies and moralities that presume untenable 
metaphysics.234  They also invite criticism and conflict because, Nietzsche argues, 
criticism and conflict “overcome” the older values and thought that promotes mediocrity 
and weakness.235  Strong, spirited and capable of greatness, Nietzsche gives the 
Übermenschen the task of overcoming humanity’s mistakes by demanding a revaluation 
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of values and calling others to a radical and honest self-awareness.  Nietzsche concisely 
explains the plot of the Übermensch in Beyond Good and Evil: 
… toward spirits strong and original enough to provide the stimuli 
for opposite valuations and to revalue and invert “eternal values”; toward 
forerunners, toward men of the future who in the present tie the knot and 
constraint that forces the will of millennia upon new tracks. To teach man 
the future of man as his will, as dependent on a human will, and to prepare 
great ventures and overall attempts of discipline and cultivation by way of 
putting an end to that gruesome domination of nonsense and accident that 
has so far been called “history”—the nonsense of the “greater number” is 
merely its ultimate form: at some time new types of philosophers and 
commanders will be necessary for that, and whatever has existed on earth 
of concealed, terrible, and benevolent spirits, will look pale and dwarfed 
by comparison…236  
 
Central to the present discussion is Nietzsche’s Übermenschen and the dire situation in 
which they find themselves.  Nietzsche prescribes his healthy friends the weighty task of 
cultivating the Übermenschen-like qualities within another and inspiring one another to 
revaluate the enslaving dispositions within their own lives.  Thus, Nietzsche’s friendship 
plays a central role in what he sees as the “new task” of the Übermenschen and a basic 
aim of humanity. 
  
_________________ 
 
 In this dissertation I have sought to establish the crucial role of friendship within 
Nietzsche’s philosophy by demonstrating how the untraditional role of the critical, 
selfish, warring friend cultivates a type of person that holds particular value in the 
development of humanity.  In the first chapter I identified where friendship appears in his 
works and suggested that his attention to friendship indicates its importance within his 
philosophy.  The second chapter explicated Nietzsche’s understanding of friendship and 
it is here that I described what he exactly means by “friendship.”  Thus, in chapter one 
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and two I primarily interpreted how Nietzsche treats friendship.  Having interpreted his 
account of friendship, in the third chapter I established the moral content of friendship as 
Nietzsche understands it.    
 Nietzsche’s attitude toward friendship is unorthodox, and yet can be argued to be 
constructive.  So it is that he is also markedly hopeful of a person’s ability to overcome a 
destructive past in the companionship of a friend.  Consistent with his natural 
interpretation of the world and human beings, Nietzsche’s healthy friendship relies on the 
fact that persons are organic, moldable beings who are capable of being cultivated and 
refined through criticism.  In this sense, healthy friendship is an implicitly moral 
relationship in Nietzsche’s philosophy because friends are uniquely instrumental in 
cultivating self-betterment.  As a philosopher who was known for being hermit-like, 
critical of morality, God and Christianity, his attitude toward friendship is both similar to 
his critical tone and yet it is also conspicuously positive.  Unlike his polemics against 
traditional morality and the Christian God, Nietzsche demonstrates how he is a 
philosopher of life by identifying the value in a friendship’s potential to cultivate strength 
and character in both self and other.  Containing elements of both “laughter,” 
“aggravation,” and “silence,” friendship is also the “festival of the earth” as Nietzsche 
describes, and most importantly, it is “anticipation of the Übermensch.”     
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